Se§ton

Vol. 6

Mail
Fall 1974

evawRriew
No. I

LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT
MATTER IN THE NEW JERSEY COURTS:
APPLICATION OF N.J.R. 1:13-4, THE
TRANSFER OF CAUSES RULE
Joseph M. Lynch*

INTRODUCTION

It is generally stated as a principle of American law that every
act of a court lacking jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is a nullity, including the eventual judgment.' Nor is the fundamental impotency overcome by consent of the parties.2
This rule has come under scrutiny in recent years. The late
Professor Edson R. Sunderland subjected its application within a
state court system to a withering attack 3 While its application in
*
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' See, e.g., Oil Well Supply Co. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 2d 624, 626, 51 P.2d 908,
908 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935); Gill v. Lynch, 367 Ill. 203, 208, 10 N.E.2d 812, 814 (1937); State
ex rel. Hall v. Hall, 153 Ore. 127, 129, 55 P.2d 1102, 1103 (1936); Perkins v. Hall, 123 W. Va.
707, 711, 17 S.E.2d 795, 799 (1941).
' See, e.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951); McLain v.
Brewington, 138 Ark. 157, 161, 211 S.W. 174, 175 (1919); Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 Comst. 9, 12
(N.Y. 1849). Jurisdiction over the subject matter is, of course, to be distinguished from
jurisdiction over the person which can be conferred by consent.
I Sunderland, Problems Connected with the Operation of a State Court System, 1950 Wis. L.
Rrv. 585, 585-89. After stating the general principle regarding lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, Professor Sunderland observed:
Most of the states, however, have done nothing to ameliorate the absurd and
frightful consequences flowing from a want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
The concept of jurisdiction has assumed an almost superstitious significance, and
want of jurisdiction has become a judicial taboo. There must be no trifling with its
sinister power. Economic advantage, social benefit, convenience-all these count for
nothing in the [ace of its devastating logic. An act done without jurisdiction is no act
at all, an absolute nullity. Orders made without jurisdiction are merely blank paper.
They cannot be vitalized by any subsequent act, for you cannot make something out

2
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the federal system has been defended,4 it has also been criticized
when invoked by an appellate court on its own motion. 5

The origin of the rule is said to have been based in reasons of
state-the determination of the common law courts representing

the Crown to restrict the competence of Church courts and to
wrest control of the administration of justice from the courts of the

local magnates. A decline in an earlier practice of finding jurisdicof nothing. The vocabulary of negation has been exhausted in describing proceedirigs without or in excess of jurisdiction.
The real difficulty is that want of jurisdiction in any case has been treated as
though it were due to the fault of the litigating parties. They were presumed to
know the law, and they failed to observe its rules. Therefore, they should take the
consequences, and if the penalty is severe it will perhaps teach them to be more
circumspect next time. But one who looks more deeply might well inquire whether
the real fault is not with the state which forces the litigant to face a jurisdictional
dilemma which never ought to exist. The courts are established to render service,
but every obstacle placed in the path of those wishing to use them diminishes their
value to the public which they serve.
Id. at 588. See also Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C.L. REv. 49 (1961).
' C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (2d ed. 1970), in which the conceptual
argument for the rule is stated but not personally endorsed. Unlike the state courts with
general jurisdictional power, the Constitution created federal courts of limited jurisdiction.
Professor Wright notes that an action in a federal court without subject matter jurisdiction
would have to be dismissed
[b]ecause of this unusual nature of the federal courts, and because it would not
be simply wrong but indeed an unconstitutional invasion of the powers reserved to
the states if those courts were to entertain cases not within their jurisdiction ....
;d. at 15. However, Professor Wright further remarks upon allowingjurisdictional defects to
interfere with an otherwise proper and just disposition on the merits:
Such a harsh rule could hardly be defended as a sensible regulation of procedure,
and can only be justified by the delicate problems of federal-state relations that are
involved.
Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
5 1 J. MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.60[4], at 610-11 (2d ed. rev. 1974). Professor
Moore in criticizing a strict application of the traditional jurisdiction rule stated: "Such
doctrines, however, do not increase respect for judicial administration, and are not necessary
for the preservation of the proper distribution of judicial power." Id. at 611. See also Morse,
Judicial Self-Denial andJudicialActivism-The Personality of the OriginalJurisdiction of the Federal
District Courts (pts. 1 & 2), 3 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 101 (1954), 4 CLEV.-MAR. L. Rxv. 7 (1955).
A few federal courts, however, have taken a more flexible approach to the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction. For example, in Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d
141 (3d Cir. 1960), it was held that a defendant could not claim lack of jurisdiction where it
had previously stipulated the existence of necessary jurisdictional facts. The defendant
raised the jurisdiction question only after the statute of limitations had expired. The Third
Circuit would not allow the defendant to "play fast and loose with the judicial machinery and
deceive the courts." Id. at 144.
Di Frischia has been given theoretical support in Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosingthe
Issue of Subject-MatterJurisdictionBefore FinalJudgment, 51 MINN. L. REv. 491, 504-09 (1967).
For federal district court treatment of the issue on grounds which would constitute
estoppel see Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252, 254-55 (W.D. Pa. 1958),
supported by Stephens, Estoppel to Deny FederalJurisdiction-Kleeand Di FrischiaBreak Ground,
68 DICK. L. REv. 39, 40-43 (1963). See also Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70, 72-73 (7th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); Kreger v. Ryan Bros., 308 F. Supp. 727, 728-29
(W.D. Pa. 1970).
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tion in consent was one of the consequences of this constitutional
struggle for power. 6 Thereafter, in this country, the influence of
federal precedents and Judge Cooley's formulation of the rule,
based in large part on the federal precedents, proved decisive. 7
Insofar as state practice was concerned, Professor Sunderland
summarized the difficulties.' Jurisdiction is based on various distinctions spread among various courts. There are separate courts
for cases of large and small amounts with an arbitrary dollar
division between them. Among the trial courts, there are separate
probate courts and family courts, and courts for causes arising in
certain localities. There are courts which may handle equity matters and others which may not. There are municipal courts. Finally,
there are courts of review. Jurisdiction is sometimes exclusive,
sometimes concurrent. And the lines of legislative demarcation as
to jurisdiction are not always clear and are from time to time
shifted by amendment or judicial construction. Yet an error in
assignment of a case proves fatal; the parties must begin again in
the proper court. 9
Professor Sunderland considered the remedy for this ill to lie
in the adoption of a general rule of construction whereby the
various statutory provisions for the distribution of judicial business
would be considered directory rather than mandatory. t ° This result might be achieved chiefly by the transfer of any case during the
proceedings to the proper court "with no loss to the proceedings
already had" and, if the mistake had not been discovered until
after the judgment, by the validation of that judgment.'i He per6 Dobbs, supra note 3, at 54-66. See also D. LOUISELL

& G.

HAZARD,

PLEADING AND

PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDERAL 487-88 (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as LoUISELL &
HAZARD].

7 See LOUISELL & HAZARD, Supra note 6, at 488-90. The eminent 19th century jurist and
legal commentator, Thomas McIntyre Cooley, set forth the consequences of lack of subject
matter jurisdiction:
A court has jurisdiction of any subject-matter, if, by the law of its organization,
it has authority to take cognizan.ce of, try, and determine cases of that description.
If it assumes to act in a case over which the law does not give it authority, the
proceeding and judgment wili be altogether void, and rights of property cannot be
divested by means of them.
T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 846 (8th ed. 1927). While
Judge Cooley's formulation of the rule became firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence, it has been characterized as "a loose reading of the precedents." LOUISELL & HAZARD,
supra note 6, at 488.
8 Sunderland, supra note 3, at 585-86.
9 Id.
I0 Id. at 586.
II Id.
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ceived this remedy in New Jersey's adoption in 1912 of a statute
designed to promote such transfers and accordingly known as the
1
"Transfer of Causes Act."

2

It will be the purpose of this article to study the law of New
Jersey since the enactment of the 1912 statute to discover what
effect the Act and its subsequent amendments and successor rules
of court, as construed by the courts have had upon the basic principle of invalidity attaching to the judgment of a court lacking
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Our study will be complicated
by two factors. First, the 1947 constitution of the State of New
Jersey made significant changes in the state's judicial system. Second, that constitution conferred upon the New Jersey supreme
13
court the power to make rules regarding practice and procedure;
and that court, pursuant to such power, did, after some hesitation,
incorporate the basic provisions of the 1912 statute, as amended
and supplemented, in a rule of court. For the sake of clarity, we
will first briefly consider the development of the law under the old
court system from the adoption of the original enactment in 1912
until September 1948, at which time that court system was terminated by the new constitution,1 4 and then the various changes
made under the new court system during the transitional period of
1948 through 1954. Finally, we shall examine the law as it has
developed thereafter.
PRACTICE UNDER THE OLD SYSTEM

Prior to 1948, New Jersey's judicial system was a maze of
courts and jurisdictions. There were separate trial courts at law,
equity and probate: the supreme court and the circuit court for
law; the court of chancery for equity; and the prerogative court for
12 Id. at 587-88. The statute was Law of March 28, 1912, ch. 233, §§ 1-4, [1912] N.J.
Laws 417.
13 N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 2,

3; id.art. 11, § 4, 5. This article will not consider the
question as to whether provision for the transfer of causes is a matter for the exercise of the
judicial rulemaking power governing practice and procedure in the courts. In 1912, it was
obviously considered a matter for legislative action. In 1952 the statute was repealed. See
note 53 infra. This left the field dear for judicial action. The Transfer of Causes Rule not only
affects jurisdiction of the subject matter in the courts, but also the operation of the various
statutes of limitation, which traditionally are matters considered to be within the competence
of the legislature-not the courts. Quaere: Are these matters of practice and procedure?
14 On September 15, 1948, the Judicial Article of the 1947 constitution went into effect.
N.J. CONST. art. 11, § 4,
14. This abolished the old court of errors and appeals, the
supreme court, the court of chancery, the prerogative court, and the circuit courts. The
jurisdictional power of these courts was transferred to the new supreme court and superior
court. Id. 3.
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probate. The supreme court also had an intermediate appellate
jurisdiction in actions at law. Furthermore, each county had separate courts of civil (law and probate) and criminal jurisdiction: the
court of common pleas, the orphans' court, the court of oyer and
terminer, the court of quarter sessions, the court of special sessions, and the surrogate's court. There were, in addition, the inferior courts: the county district court in each county for the trial
of actions at law involving ordinary matters of limited amount; the
juvenile and domestic relations court in some of the counties; and,
among others, the municipal court in the various municipalities.
Overall, there was a court of final review-the court of errors and
appeals.' 5 The origin and jurisdictional basis of many of the courts
lay in colonial practice and ultimately in English precedent.16 Their
antiquity was such as to induce the following observation from
D.W. Brogan, the eminent authority on both English and American political and governmental institutions:
[I]f you want to see the old common law in all its picturesque
formality, with its fictions and its fads, its delays and uncertainties, the place to look for them is not London, not in the Modern
Gothic of the Law Courts in the Strand, but in New Jersey.
Dickens, or any other law-reformer of a century ago, would feel
more at home in Trenton than in London, where, despite the
survival of wigs and miniver and maces, the law has been modernized, simplified, made more rapid and
efficient; in fact, every7
thing that is desirable except cheap.'
A spirited effort to simplify this multiplicity, embodied in a
proposal to amend the constitution of 1844 by merging the various
statewide trial courts into one court and the various county courts
in each county into one county court, failed at the polls in 1909.8
5 Harrison, New Jersey's New Court System, 2 RUTGERS L. REv. 60, 64-71 (1948);'McConnell, A Brief History of the New Jersey Courts, 1 N.J. DIGEST 349, 352-53 (West 1954). The
constitutional courts of the old system are listed in N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (1844).
16 Harrison, supra note 15, at 64-65.
17 D.W. BROGAN, THE ENGLISH PEOPLE, IMPRESSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 108 (1943),
quoted in FUNDAMENTAL LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS OF NEW JERSEY 42 (J. Boyd ed. 1964).
" For text of the proposed amendment see N.J. Senate Con. Res. No. I (introduced
Jan. 18, 1909) [hereinafter cited as S.C.R. No. 1]. The proposed amendment would have
abolished the existing court structure, replacing it with a system similar to that established by
the 1947 constitution. Notably, the proposed amendment would have merged the separate
courts of law and equity. Id. at 5. The proposal was supported by the incumbent governor.
Address by Governor Fort, Meeting of the N.J. Bar Association, June 11, 1909, reprinted in
32 N.J.L.J. 197-99 (1909). Nevertheless, this and other constitutional amendments were
defeated "by a large majority" in a special election on September 14, 1909. EditorialNotes, 32
N.J.L.J. 257 (1909).
The 1909 effort to reform the court system was only one of a long series of such
attempts. For an overview of this topic see Erdman, The Movement for JudicialReorganization,
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Following that, a second best result was achieved in the enactment
in 1912 of the "Transfer of Causes Act."' 19 This statute provided
that no civil cause pending in the court of chancery, the supreme
court, or the circuit court, which were courts of statewide jurisdiction, or in the courts of common pleas, which were county courts,
was to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
but was to be transferred with its record
for hearing and determination to the proper court, which shall
thereupon proceed therein, as if the cause or matter had been
originally commenced in that court.'"
The original statute was thus limited in its scope. Not only did
it pertain to only a few of the many courts of original jurisdiction
in the state system, but also did not confer power to transfer upon
the appellate courts. Thus, while an erroneous order of transfer
might be the subject of an appeal for reversal, an erroneous retention of jurisdiction could only lead to a futile trial on the merits
followed by an appeal and a subsequent reversal for lack of jurisdiction in the trial court, since in the latter case the usual American
rule would apply-a judgment of a court lacking such jurisdiction
is void and subject to reversal on appeal. To remedy ,this defect
and to broaden the scope of the Act, it was amended in 1915 to
provide that
[s]uch transfer may be made at any stage of the proceedings...
and upon an appeal being taken in any such cause that had not
been so transferred the appellate court may... hear and decide
such appeal and direct the appropriate decree or judgment ...
3 N.J. BAR Q. 304 (1936). Proposed amendments to revamp the courts were passed by one
or both houses of the legislature nineteen times between 1880 and 1935. Id. at 304. On three
occasions, in 1890, 1903, and 1909, proposed constitutional amendments failed at the polls.
Id. at 308, 311-12, 315-17. The thrust of the reform movement was to create'an independent
court of errors and appeals, to merge law and equity, and to otherwise simplify the
jurisdictional maze of the court system. Id. at 318. The attempts to reorganize the court
system failed at the special elections because of the low voter turn-out, opposition to
unrelated proposals at the same special elections, and purely partisan politics. There was no
disagreement that the court system was in need of fundamental reform. Id. at 308, 311-12,
315-17.
"g Law of March 28, 1912, ch. 233, §§ 1-4, [1912] N.J. Laws 417.
20 Id. § 1. The origin of this enactment may be found in a provision of the defeated
1909 proposal to amend the constitution of 1844. The proposal would have amended article
VI, creating a new supreme court with an appellate division, a law division, and a chancery
division. SC.R. No. 1, supra note 18, at 2. The proposal also would have allowed the newly
created supreme court to
provide by rule for the transfer of any cause or issue from the Law Division to the
Chancery Division, or from the Chancery Division to the Law Division of the
Supreme Court ... and for the giving of complete legal and equitable relief in any
cause in the court or division where it may be pending.
Id. at 5.
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to be entered in 2the
court to which such cause ought to have
1
been transferred.

In 1936 the scope of the statute was again extended, this time
to apply to additional courts of original jurisdiction, the county
district court, the court of oyer and terminer, the court of quarter
sessions, and the court of special sessions; and to authorize the

transfer of a cause for lack of jurisdiction "either in the original
suit or on appeal. ' '22 In the general revision of the laws made in

1937, this Act with its amendments became N.J.

REV.

STAT.

§§ 2:26-60 to -65, and as such became the basic referent until its

repeal on January 1, 1952.23
Before considering the further changes made after the adoption of the 1947 constitution, it would be well to pause and state
what the basic statutory scheme provided and how the courts
utilized its provisions to accomplish its purposes. The first provision, that prescribing a transfer from one trial court to another,
presented no problems. Operating as a procedural device, it authorized the clerk of the court lacking jurisdiction to forward the
papers to the clerk of the court having jurisdiction. Thus such a
transfer between trial courts was permitted, even though the
statute of limitations had run before the date of transfer, as long as
the action had been timely-though mistakenly--commenced in
the transferring court.2 4 Further, it was held that process issued in
2

Law of Feb. 24, 1915, ch. 13, § 2, [1915] N.J. Laws 39. This statute, approved on the

24th of February, 1915, was probably inspired by the appeal in Thropp v. Public Serv. Elec.
Co., 84 N.J. Eq. 144, 93 A. 693 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915), argued December 7, 1914, but
decided on March 1, 1915 without reference to the amendment. The court reversed an
order of injunction for lack of jurisdiction in chancery, there being an adequate remedy at
law, and remanded with a direction to transfer the action to the law courts. Id. at 147, 93 A.
at 694.
22 Law of June 22, 1936, ch. 163, §§ 1-3, [1936] N.J. Laws 386. This amendment was
the first time that provision was made for transfer in a criminal case. Of the four courts
added by the 1936 amendment, three had criminal jurisdiction-the court of oyer and
terminer, the court of quartet sessions, and the court of special sessions. To extend the act to
criminal causes it was also necessary to amend section one. The original 1912 enactment had
provided for transfer of any "civil cause or matter." The 1936 amendment simply deleted
the limitation of "civil." Id. § 1.
23 Law of Dec. 5, 1951, ch. 344, §§ 1-12, [1951] N.J. Laws 1453-55. In 1951 the
legislature completely revised title 2 of the 1937 statutes dealing with the administration of
criminal and civil justice. Chapter 344 constituted the entire revision, designated title 2A. Id.
§ 1, at 1453. Section 4 was the repeal of old title 2. The Transfer of Causes Act, not included
in the revised title 2A, was consequently repealed.
24 Carey v. Brown, 92 N.J. Eq. 497, 499, 113 A. 499, 500-01 (Ch. 1921) (dictum). But cf.
Thomas v. Flanagan, 99 N.J. Eq. 717, 719, 134 A. 298, 298-99 (Ch. 1926), in which it was
held that a case could not be transferred from chancery to law after the statute of limitations
had run because it had not been brought "mistakenly" in the chancery court. As to the
operation of the Transfer of Causes Act on the statutes of limitations see note 13 supra.
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the transferring court, such as 2a5 writ of attachment, would be
honored in the transferee court.
When, however, we consider the second provision of the Act
-that enabling an appellate court in its discretion, failing a transfer in the court of original trial jurisdiction, to hear and determine
the appeal on the merits and transfer on remand-we come to a
more complicated matter. Of course there is no problem where the
appellate court, apprised of the jurisdictional deficiency of the
lower court, elects not to determine the appeal on the merits but
simply to vacate the judgment below for lack of jurisdiction, remanding to the proper court for a new trial. In that event, the
statute, so construed, operates again as a procedural device, affecting the forwarding and receiving of papers.
The statute, however, contemplated more than that. By enabling the appellate court to hear and determine the case on the
merits and to remand to the proper court, it envisioned the validation of the proceedings of the trial court, including its judgment,
even though it lacked jurisdiction. This is most apparent in the case
of a reversal whether coupled with an order for a new trial or for
the entry of a judgment opposite to the one originally determined.
In form, the judgment is that of the transferee court; in substance,
it is that of the transferring court which lacks the power to enter it.
The process is of course fictional, but one implicit in the statutory
provisions. Through this fiction, it would be possible to say that
New Jersey maintains the usual American rule that the judgment
of a court lacking jurisdiction over the subject matter is void-but
upon transfer such a judgment may be validated. A similar problem
is raised under the initial provision of the statute, by which transfer
is sought from a trial court after a hearing and determination in
that court. In such a case a transfer, involving the direction to
enter judgment in the transferee court, would be more than a
matter of practice and procedure. At issue would be the validation
26
of acts of a court lacking the power to enter them.
25

Vaux v. Vaux, 115 N.J. Eq. 586, 588, 172 A. 68, 69 (Ch. 1934). The court emphati-

cally stated:
The Transfer of Causes act gives to the court in which the suit is begun,
jurisdiction of the action for the purpose of the transfer. The process which brings
the defendant into the first court is given the *samevalidity for that purpose, at least,
as if the court had full jurisdiction of the cause of action; and so upon the transfer,
the second court has jurisdiction over his person without further process.
Id.26 Such a possibility, however, was contemplated in the 1915 and 1936 amendments. See
notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text. The 1937 codification provided: "A cause or
matter may be transferred under authority of this article at any stage of the proceedings
therein." N.J. REv. STAT. § 2:26-62 (1937) (emphasis added).
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The courts under the old practice generally chose not to become involved in these problems. Where the separate statewide
courts of law and equity were involved, the constitutional right to
trial by jury obtruded. So the former court of chancery, deciding
after a trial on the merits that the petitioner must fail because he
had an adequate remedy at law, would order transfer to law so the
parties might have their trial by jury. 27 And the court of errors and
appeals, reversing a chancery decree for money damages for want
of equitable jurisdiction had, instead of deciding the case on its
merits, ordered the cause transferred to a court of law for trial. 28
Indeed, judicial conservatism under the former system was
such that it was held improper for a law court, when faced with an
equitable defense to a legal claim, to transfer the cause to the court
of chancery for the purpose of trying this defense. Instead, as
before, the case must proceed piecemeal. 2 9 The Act, it was held,
did not apply: the court of law did have jurisdiction to hear -the
claim; its lack pertained only to the trial of the issue.3 0 The statute
3
did not deal in such nuances.

1

27 Scerbak v. Lane, 102 N.J. Eq. 497, 501-62, 141 A. 582, 583-84 (Ch. 1928). This case
involved the transfer of a cause which had begun as an action at law on a promissory note.
In the course of the trial, the law judge perceived the case as being one for the court of
chancery. Id. at 499-501, 141 A. at 583. The obligors contended that they were "ignorant and
illiterate" and did not understand the nature of the instrument they had signed. Id. at 500,
141 A. at 583. In ordering the return of the case to the law courts, the vice-chancellor stated:
It seems to me, in the first place, that the law court had jurisdiction, and that
there was no specific ground of exclusive equitable jurisdiction involved. That being
so, [the transfer from law] was erroneous, because it is only where a case is pending
in a court that has no jurisdiction that the Transfer of Causes act applies, and
permits the transfer to another court which has jurisdiction.
Id. at 501, 141 A. at 583 (emphasis in original). Since there was no basis for exclusive
equitable relief, there was an adequate remedy at law. The effect of ignorance or misrepresentations on the obligation of the note raised "a jury question . . . which should be
determined in the court of law." Id. at 502, 141 A. at 584.
28 F. W. Horstmann Co. v. Rothfuss, 128 N.J. Eq. 168, 171, 15 A.2d 623, 625 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1940). See also Stein v. Elizabeth Trust Co., 131 N.J. Eq. 35, 36, 22 A.2d 872, 874
(Ct. Err. & App. 1941), in which after reversal of a chancery decree for want of equitable
jurisdiction, the suit had been transferred to the supreme court for trial at law.
29 Thus, for example, an unsuccessful defendant in a contract action in a law court
could apply to the court of chancery for equitable relief by way of reformation of the
contract. See Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. New Jersey Rubber Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 338,
343-44, 51 A. 451, 453 (Ct. Err. & App. 1902). Similarly, a plaintiff who had lost at law in a
contract action was not barred from seeking reformation of the contract in chancery. See
Knight v. Electric Household Util. Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 87, 91-92, 30 A.2d 585, 587-88 (Ch.
1943), affd, 134 N.J.'Eq. 542, 36 A.2d 201 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944).
30 Curran v. Carroll, 101 N.J.L. 329, 333, 128 A. 164, 165 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925); Hunt
v. Gorenberg, 9 N.J. Misc. 463, 473-74, 155 A. 881, 886 (Sup. Ct. 1930); cf. Scerbak v. Lane,
102 N.J. Eq. 497, 501, 141 A. 582, 583 (Ch. 1928).
31 Transfer for lack of jurisdiction of an issue had been included in the 1909 proposal
to amend the 1844 constitution. See note 20 supra.
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Thus before the merger of law and equity in 1948, the Act was
limited in its scope. It did not apply to all courts. It did not affect
the transfer of causes where the trial of only certain issues was
beyond the jurisdiction of 'the court. And although the Act did
provide for the appellate validation of the proceedings heard in a
trial court lacking jurisdiction, it was not so applied, usually out of
consideration for the constitutional requirements of trial by jury.
A more thoroughgoing reform would have to await the advent
of a new judicial attitude. This came with the adoption of the 1947
constitution with its complete revision of the judicial system.
TRANSITION UNDER

THE

1947

CONSTITUTION

Under the 1947 constitution, the superior court was created-a
court of original statewide jurisdiction in matters of law, equity,
and probate, having the powers of the former supreme court, the
32
circuit court, the court of chancery, and the prerogative court.

The superior court was divided into two trial divisions, law and
chancery, each, subject to rules of court, exercising the powers of
the other when justice so required, granting "legal and equitable
relief

.

. .

in any cause so that all matters in controversy between

the parties may be completely determined.1 33 With this merger
of law and equity in the superior court, the principal reform attempted in the 1909 proposal to amend the constitution of 1844
3 4

was at last accomplished.

Pursuant to the 1947 constitutional mandate, a rule of court
provided that all actions, maintainable under the former practice
in the court of chancery or in the prerogative court, should thereafter be brought in the chancery division; all other actions in the
superior court were to be maintained in the law division.35 The
rules further provided for the transfer from one division to
another in the event of improper placement. 3 6 It was early recognized that such a transfer was to be effected under the rules of
32

N.J. CONST. art. 11, § 4,

3, 8, 10; id. art. 6, § 3.

a Id. art. 6, § 3,
3, 4.
14 See note 18 supra.
'5 N.J.R. 3:40-2 (1948). This rule has been maintained through both of the major
revisions of the court rules. The rule was retained in the 1953 revision in N.J.R.R. 4:41-2
and became N.J.R. 4:3-1(a)(lI in the 1969 revision.
36 N.J.R. 3:40-3 (1948). This rule was also substantially continued throughout the rule
revisions. It became N.J.R.R. 4:41-3 (1953) and in 1969, with some modification, N.J.R.
4:3-1(a)(2). For a recent case applying the divisional transfer rule and discussing its underlying policies see Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Butler, 128 N.J. Super. 492, 494-97, 320
A.2d 515, 517-18 (Ch. 1974).
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court. The Transfer of Causes Act was not to be invoked, inasmuch as that statute applied not to divisional transfer, but to court
transfer. 7
Practice in the county courts had also been simplified. The
1947 constitution provided for one county court in each county,
having the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the separate courts of
common pleas, orphans' court, court of oyer and terminer, court
of quarter sessions and court of special sessions. 38

Nevertheless,

there still remained 21 separate county courts as well as the various
"inferior courts of limited jurisdiction": 39 the juvenile and domestic
relations court, the county district court, and the municipal court,
among others. 40 The basic reason for the enactment of the Transfer of Causes Act in 1912 may have been eliminated, but in view of
the considerable number of courts of separate jurisdiction, it continued to have purpose.
Accordingly, early in 1949, the Act was used to effect the
transfer of a local action, brought in the county court of a county
in which the realty was not located, to the proper court-either the
county court of the county in which the land was situated or the
superior court.4 1 In passing, it was noted that the Act would not
apply to transfers from the superior court because of the merger
of law and equity, and that the matter of transfer between courts
was one of practice and procedure, regulable by rule of the newly
42
created supreme court.
Influenced perhaps by this decision and the accompanying
dictum, the supreme court later that year, considering that such a
transfer was indeed a matter of practice and procedure, adopted
R. 1:7-8A. 4 3 Paragraph (a) of the rule authorized, as before, transfers of civil causes from a county court or a county district court
lacking jurisdiction thereof to a proper court. It further
authorized-this was new; the statute, we have seen, made no such
provision-transfer where either of these courts lacked jurisdiction
" See Galloway v. Eichells, 1 N.J. Super. 584, 590-91, 62 A.2d 499, 502-03 (Ch. 1948),
in which the court made no reference to the Transfer of Causes Act but relied solely on the
rules of court in ordering transfer to the law division for a trial by jury.
s N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 4,
1. The county courts have probate divisions which handle
probate matters within their inherited jurisdiction and law divisions which dispose of the
county courts' criminal and civil jurisdiction. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3-1 (1952).
3 N.J. CoNST. art. 6, § 1,
1.
o McConnell, supra note 15, at 356-57.
4' Donker v. National Newspaper Corp., 65 A.2d 120, 121-22 (N.J. Essex County Ct.
1949).
42 Id. at 122.
4' For text of the rule see 72 N.J.L.J. 373 (1949).
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over the trial of any issue.4 4 This would prove useful, for while the
county court under the new constitution did have incidental, but
not primary, equitable jurisdiction,4 5 the extent of this power was
46
not clear. Moreover, its powers at law were sometimes limited.
And the county district court was at that time considered to have
no equitable jurisdiction whatsoever. 4 7 Paragraph (b) of the rule
44 Thus at last was accomplished the reform contemplated in the proposed constitutional amendment of 1909. See note 20 supra.
45 N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 4, $ 1, 4, 5; id. art, 11, § 4,
4. Regarding the incidental
equitable powers of the county courts see Tumarkin v. Friedman, 17 N.J. Super. 20, 24-27,
85 A.2d 304, 306-07 (App. Div. 1951), cert. denied, 9 N.J. 287, 88 A.2d 39 (1952), in which it
was held that the county court having proper jurisdiction was empowered to grant all legal
and equitable relief necessary for complete determination of the case. See also Donnelly v.
Ritzendollar, 14 N.J. 96, 101-06, 101 A.2d 1, 4-6 (1953); Carton v. Borden, 8 N.J. 352,
357-58, 85 A.2d 257, 259 (1951); Miske v. Habay, 1 N.J. 368, 374-75, 63 A.2d 883, 886
(1949); Heuter v. Coastal Air Lines, Inc., 12 N.J. Super. 490, 494-95, 79 A.2d 880, 883
(App. Div. 1951); Stier v. Schreiber, 3 N.J. Super. 450, 451, 66 A.2d 463, 463 (Essex County
Ct. 1949).
16 Although a constitutional court, the jurisdiction of the county court is subject to
legislative alteration. See N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 4, 44 1, 4. For example, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:3-3 (1952) provides that the county court has general jurisdiction over all civil actions at
law "other than proceedings in lieu of prerogative writs." Jurisdiction in prerogative writ
actions is vested in the superior court. N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 5, 4. Exercising its rulemaking
power, the supreme court has provided that proceedings in lieu of prerogative writs are to
be brought in the appellate division or law division of the superior court, but not in the
chancery division. Compare N.J.R. 2:2-3 (1969) with N.J.R. 4:69-1 (1969). But see Shepard v.
Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 128 N.J. Super. 379, 320 A.2d 191 (Ch. 1974)
(action in lieu of prerogative writ challenging zoning ordinance).
Judicial doubt has also been expressed as to the county court's jurisdiction to determine
title to realty-even in an action involving the distribution of an intestate estate, which is
clearly within that court's probate jurisdiction. In the case of In re Estate of Weeast, 72 N.J.
Super. 325, 178 A.2d 113 (Burlington County Ct. 1962), the court stated: "The County
Court has no jurisdiction to try title to real estate." Id. at 333, 178 A.2d at 117. This
sweeping statement seems in error in the light of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35-1 (1952), which
provides that
[a]ny person ...claiming title to such real property, shall be entitled to have his
rights determined in an action in the superior court or in the county court of the
county wherein the real property is located.
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3-3 (1952), which confers general jurisdiction upon the county
courts in an action at law. This incorporated the provisions of Law of June 22, 1936, ch. 200,
[1936] N.J. Laws 493, which had stricken language of an earlier statute, Law of March 23,
1900, ch. 140, § 4,-[1900] N.J. Laws 332, excluding the trial of realty title actions from the
jurisdiction of the court of 'common pleas-the predecessor of the county court. See A.
CLAPP, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION, 7 N.J. PRACTICE § 1911 n.9 (Supp. 1973).
4' The county district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction created by statute and not
the constitution. The statute defining the jurisdiction of the county district court limits the
amount in controversy and the actions to those having "a civil nature at law." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:6-34 (a) (Supp. 1974-75). The statute was construed as precluding consideration
of equitable actions and equitable issues by the county district court. Compare Josefowicz v.
Porter, 32 N.J. Super. 585, 589, 108 A.2d 865, 867 (App. Div. 1954) (action for rescission)
with Scott v. Bodnar, 52 N.J. Super. 439, 442, 145 A.2d 643, 645 (App. Div. 1958), cert.
denied, 29 N.J. 136, 148 A.2d 650 (1959) (reply raising equitable avoidance to defense of
release).
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authorized, as before, an appellate court, failing such a transfer
below, to hear and decide the appeal on the merits and remand the
case for entry of judgment in the proper court.
There were two significant omissions from the former statutory scheme. First, the rule, probably through inadvertence, did
not make explicit provision for the transfer "at any stage of the
proceedings" in the trial court, as had the 1915 amendment and
the 1937 revision; instead, adopting the direction contained in the
original statute of 1912, it provided for a transfer "to the proper
court for determination. ' 48 Second, again probably through inadvertence, the rule failed to provide for transfer fQr lack of appellate jurisdiction.4 9 It reverted to the direction of the original statute
of 1912 instead of to the provision in the 1936 amendment which
had been carried forward in the 1937 general statutory revision.
These omissions, however, seem to have been unnoticed by the
courts in their decisions of the later cases.
There was a third omission in the new rule. It did not provide
for transfers from the superior court, probably in reliance on the
constitutional provision that such court "shall have original general
jurisdiction throughout the State in all causes. ' 50 Despite the apparently absolute language of this provision, the supreme court
subsequently decided in 1951 that the superior court did lack
jurisdiction over the complaint of an unwed mother seeking judgment of paternity against a putative father and a consequent award
In Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v. De Marco, 35 N.J. 459, 173 A.2d 270 (1961), the
supreme court addressed itself to the doubts about "the power of the county district court to
deal with equitable issues arising in a case which otherwise is within its jurisdiction." Id. at
465-66, 173 A.2d at 274. After reviewing the judicial reform effected in New Jersey to avoid
jurisdictional disputes between courts of law and equity, the court examined the various
rules of court and concluded:
Hence the county district court must accept any equitable issue offered to
defeat an action within its jurisdiction or to avoid a separate defense to such action.
The rules of court are plain; there no longer is a barrier to the rendition of the
correct judgment. To hold otherwise would continue the procedural waste which
the constitutional reform intended to end and indeed at a level of litigation wherein
the litigants can least afford to bear it.
Id. at 469, 173 A.2d at 275-76. For editorial commentary on this decision see Equity in the
District Courts, 84 N.J.L.J. 548 (1961). See also Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 138-40, 265
A.2d 526, 530-31 (1970) (equitable defense requiring absolution from payment of rent and
summary dispossession must be considered by the county district court).
11 Compare Law of Feb. 24, 1915, ch. 13, § 2, [1915] N.J. Laws 39 and N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 2:26-62 (1937) with 72 N.J.L.J. 373 (R. 1:7-8A) and Law of March 28, 1912, ch. 233, § 1,
[1912] N.J. Laws 417. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
" This was added to the Transfer of Causes Act in the 1936 amendment. See note 22
supra and accompanying text.
50 N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 3,
2.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 1

of support for her child.5 1 Nevertheless, no immediate change was
made in the provisions of the rule to render it applicable to the
superior court. For the time being, that court theoretically was left
uncovered. The prior statute, the Transfer of Causes Act, was
52 In
probably considered invalidated by the enactment of the rule.
5
any event, it was formally repealed as of January 1, 1952. 3
Eventually, coverage for the superior court was effected in a
general, if complicated, revision of the rules of court, operative as
of September 9, 1953. 54 In this revision, R. 1:7-8A(a) because R.R.
4:3-4 (a) and R.R. 7:6-2 (a). 5 5 R.R. 4:3-4 (a) provided for the
transfer of a civil cause from a trial division of the superior court
lacking jurisdiction either of a cause or, as before, of an issue to a
court having such jurisdiction. R.R. 7:6-2 (a) made similar provision for the county district court; and by R.R. 5:2-1, the provisions
of R.R. 4:3-4 (a) were made applicable to law actions in the county
court. 5 6 In place of former R. 1:7-8A(b), R.R. 1:4-10 and R.R.
7:6-2 (b) 5 7 provided for transfer, as before, while on appeal in the
supreme court and, by cross-reference, 58 while in the appellate
5
division of the superior court.

9

These adjustments, it was considered, would complete the
transition in practice from the old judicial system to the new.
Various improvements had been effected. The constitution had
made several; by creating a single court of statewide original jurisdiction and single courts of countywide jurisdiction, and by merging law and equity in the statewide court, it had reduced the
number of separate courts and consequently reduced the need for
the transfer of causes between separate courts. The rules had gone
" Borawick v. Barba, 7 N.J. 393, 395-98, 81 A.2d 766, 766-68 (1951).
52 See the dictum to this effect in Donker v. National Newspaper Corp., 65 A.2d 120,
122 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1949) discussed in text at note 42 supra. See also Winberry v.
Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 255, 74 A.2d 406, 414, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950), holding that
any pre-1948 statute on a procedural matter was repealed by a later rule of court in light of
the supreme court's plenary rulemaking power in such matters, conferred by paragraph 3 of
article 6, section 2 of the 1947 constitution. As to the correctness of this judgment in the
context of transfer of causes see quaere in note 13 supra.
5 See note 23 supra.
The original rules of 1948 were the subject of this complete revision, known as the
REVISION OF THE RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY (1953)
[hereinafter cited as N.J.R.R.]. See N.J.R.R. 1:1-10.
" See N.J.R.R., Table 1, at ix.
56 The rules of court governing civil actions in the county courts are now incorporated
in the rules for superior court actions. N.J.R. 4:1.
5 See N.J.R.R., Table 1, at ix.
SNJ.R.R. 2:4-1.
'9 See N.J.R.R., Table 1, at ix.
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further by authorizing transfer for lack of jurisdiction over the trial
of an issue.
The rules as revised, unlike the predecessor statute, did not
60
provide for the transfer of a criminal or a quasi-criminal case.
Thus a defendant seeking relief from an illegal sentence of a
municipal court and wrongly appealing to the law division of the
superior court instead of to the county court 6 ' could not resort to
the provisions of the various transfer rules either in the law division or in the appellate division to which he further appealed.
.Nevertheless, in such a case, the appellate division, considering that
"the Superior Court had the power as a matter of common law to
transfer the cause to the County Court, '6 2 and considering further
the spirit of the rules in effect in civil cases, proceeded as though
these rules should apply to a criminal case and by "analogy" decided the appeal on the merits in favor of the defendant, remanding the case to the county court for further proceedings.6 3
Further revisions followed this decision. The various rules
were scrapped and in their place a single one adopted: R.R. 1:27D,
to take effect at the beginning of the next judicial year, September
8, 1954.64 Under paragraph (a), "any court" lacking jurisdiction of
a cause or issue had the power to transfer the action to a proper
court. And by paragraph (b), failing such transfer, any appellate
court had the power to determine an appeal on the merits and
remand the case to a proper court. Thus, by extending to "any
court" the power to transfer, the arrangement was made applicable
to criminal as well as civil cases.
This change completed the transition from the old to the
new judicial system. The old had involved the limited practice of
the transfer of primarily civil causes by and between
certain named courts, where the transferring court lacked juris60 Transfer of criminal actions was added in the 1936 amendment. See note 22 supra.
61 An appeal from ajudgment of such a court of limited jurisdiction is taken within ten
days to the county court. N.J.R. 3:23-2.
612 Manda v. State, 28 N.J. Super. 259, 262, 100 A.2d 500, 502 (App. Div. 1953).
63 Id. at 265, 100 A.2d at 503.
77 N.J.L.J. 236 (1954). Rule 1:27D provided:
(a) Except as elsewhere provided in these rules, and subject to the right to be
prosecuted by indictment, where any court of this State is without jurisdiction of the
subject matter of an action, issue or cause, it shall, on motion or on its own
initiative, order the action or cause, with the record and all papers on file, transferred to the proper court for determination; and the action or cause shall then be
proceeded upon as if it had been originally commenced in the proper court.
(b) Where any cause transferable under paragraph (a) is appealed without
having been transferred, the appellate court may decide the appeal and direct the
appropriate judgment to be entered in the court to which the cause should have
been transferred.
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diction over the subject matter of an entire cause. The new, as
finally elaborated, permitted the transfer of any cause, civil or
criminal, by and between any court where the transferring court
lacked jurisdiction either over the subject matter of an entire cause
or of a particular issue. Thereafter, one further minor change has
been made, providing for such a transfer from a court "where an
indispensable party to the cause cannot be served within its jurisdiction" to a court where he can. 6 5 In the revision of the rules in
1969, the provisions effecting transfers are to be found, without
change, in R. 1: 13-4.66 No further change has been made to date.
We shall next consider what use the courts have made of these
provisions.
PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM

Extension of the Transfer Practice Before
Hearing and Determination: The Special
Problem of Appellate Transfer
The arrangement at last established by rule, as of 1954 and
essentially maintained thereafter, was basically that set forth in the
original statute of 1912 as amended in 1915-a transfer of a case
from one court of original jurisdiction to another, and failing this,
a determination of a later appeal on the merits in the discretion of
the appellate court and remand to the proper court. It had been
broadened in application, as we have just noted, to cover all courts,
all causes, and other deficiencies such as lack of jurisdiction over an
issue and the absence of an indispensable party.
But the rule had not made provision, as had the 1936 amendment to the statute,6 8 for the transfer of cases from one appellate
court to another, as in the case of an appeal taken from the
judgment of a trial court or administrative tribunal to the wrong
appellate court. The deficiency, however, was soon made good in
the cases. Thus, in State v. Magonia,69 it was held, without reference
65 81 N.J.L.J. 358 (1958).
66

See

RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Table of Disposi-

tion: Parts I-VIII (1969) [hereinafter cited as N.J.R.], which reflects changes made by the
1969 revision. N.J.R. 1:13-4 corresponds without change to the former N.J.R.R. 1:27D. See
also N.J.R. 4:3-4(b) and N.J.R. 6:4-1.
67 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
61 See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
69 44 N.J. Super. 89, 129 A.2d 756 (App. Div. 1957). For further proceedings in the
supreme court see 25 N.J. 95, 135 A.2d 184 (1957).
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70
to the textual difficulties involved, that the rule did so provide.
Magonia was the traditional case of an appeal taken from a trial
court of original jurisdiction to a wrong appellate court. Other
cases quickly followed, authorizing, as if under the rule, a transfer
to the right appellate court of a case appealed to the wrong appellate court from a trial decision of an administrative agency. Thus a
case appealed to the wrong county court from a determination by
the Division of Workmen's Compensation could be transferred to
the right county court.' The practice went beyond this transfer
from court to court and sanctioned the transfer, again as under the
rule, between the appellate division and either of the trial divisions
of the one superior court, in cases involving the appeal to the
wrong division from the decision of an administrative agency. 72
Thus with the approval of the supreme court,7 3 the rule was in
effect amended to authorize the transfer on appeal of causes improperly appealed to the wrong court or the wrong division of a
court.
In all of these cases, however, the transfer between appellate
courts or divisions was made prior to a determination of the merits
70 44 N.J. Super. at 92, 129 A.2d at 758. The appellate division made only the following
reference to the transfer rule:
Since the announced object of the rule [requiring the immediate certification of
capital cases to the supreme court] is to avoid undue delay, we shall invoke R. R.
1:27D and by our mandate direct the clerk of this court to transmit the record to
the Supreme Court.
ld.
71 Wexler v. Lambrecht Foods, 64 N.J. Super. 489, 494, 166 A.2d 576, 579 (App. Div.
1960). A similar result had been reached under the prior practice in Hart v. Kimball, 122
N.J.L. 217, 218-19, 4 A.2d 493, 493-94 (Sup. Ct. 1939), but at a time when expressly
authorized by statute. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
72 Pfleger v. State Highway Dep't, 104 N.J. Super. 289, 290-91, 250 A.2d 16, 17 (App.
Div. 1968). See also Valonis v. Mayor & Township Comm., 54 N.J. Super. 567, 569-70, 149
A.2d 793, 793-94 (App. Div. 1959), in which the court reviewing a municipal administrative
proceeding held that the law division should have transferred the action to the county court
for review as provided by statute rather than dismiss the prerogative writ proceeding for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. An appeal after the remand was dismissed on
other grounds. 62 N.J. Super. 241, 162 A.2d 586 (App. Div. 1960).
73 See Central R.R. v. Neeld, 26 N.J. 172, 184, 139 A.2d 110, 117, cert. denied, 357 U.S.
928 (1958). The court ordered the dismissal of complaints filed in the law division because
the plaintiff had not exhausted administrative remedies. 26 N.J. at 181, 139 A.2d at 115.
The court also acknowledged that the law division lacked jurisdiction because review of the
determinations of state administrative agencies, such as the Director of the Division of
Taxation, should be on appeal to the appellate division instead of by complaint to the law
division which reviewed local administrative determinations. But the choice of the wrong
division was not deemed to be fatal in and of itself because, under rule 1 :27D the choice of
the wrong division would result in transfer and not dismissal, at least when instituted within
the applicable time limitations. Id. at 184, 139 A.2d at 117.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 1

of the appeal. Thus, as in the case of a pre-determination transfer
at the trial level, the order was essentially a procedural one, designed to promote a faster determination of the merits of the
controversy, and in no way involving the validation of a judgment
of a court lacking jurisdiction.
Limits on Transfer After Hearing and Determination

More difficult questions arise when a transfer is sought or
made after a hearing and determination on'the merits. Ordinarily,
as the rule provides in its paragraph (b), such a transfer would be
made by an appellate court after its decision on the merits of an
appeal from a judgment of a trial court lacking jurisdiction, by
means of a remand to a trial court having such jurisdiction for the
entry of the appropriate judgment. Possibly the rule may be construed further to authorize, following hearing and determination,
the transfer from an improper appellate court to the one to which
the appeal should have been taken, with a direction from the
former court to the clerk of the latter for the entry of appropriate
judgment in his court. And sometimes such a transfer may be
sought under paragraph (a) of the rule at the trial level after
judgment on the merits, seeking validation of the transpired proceedings.
All of these cases involve, as we said when discussing the
former statutory scheme upon which the rule of court is based, a
validation through a process-of fictionalizing; by it the judgment of
the wrong court, having been declared bad as a matter of form, is
saved in substance through the process of its entry in the right
court as though it were the judgment of that court-when in fact it
is not. The rule, however, has a saving grace which leads it out of
temptation. In the case of an appeal, it confers upon the appellate
court the discretion of hearing or abstaining from hearing the
merits of the appeal."4 And in this discretion the appellate courts
have found their salvation. Relying not upon the fiction, but with
sound judicial instinct upon the varying policy considerations involved, they sometimes have opted for validation of the proceedings under challenge, sometimes through modification have
purged the proceedings of their error, and in a few cases, by
abstaining, have confirmed their invalidity. The technique of determination and transfer has been by no means automatic. The
decisions themselves lend light to the true coloration of the rule's
- ' N.J.R. 1:13-4(b). The language of the rule is clearly permissive: "[Tlhe appellate
court may decide the appeal ....

" Id. (emphasis added).
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operations. We shall discuss them in that order: validation with or
without transfer; modification without transfer; and nullification
and dismissal or transfer.
Validation With or Without Transfer:
Untimely Challenge to Apparent Authority
Usually, as we read the decisions, the jurisdictional issue is not
timely raised. This is not surprising. Ordinarily, a jurisdictional
deficiency is most likely to be a factor in one of the courts of
limited jurisdiction, such as the county district court or the juvenile
and domestic relations court, where the calendar load is extremely
heavy and the practice is summary;7 5 where lawyers talk fast and
loud and shoot from the hip and judges often respond in kind. It is
not surprising that an issue involving the jurisdiction of one of
these courts should first come to light upon appeal rather than
during the trial. Whether the issue is finally raised by one of the
appealing parties or by the court itself seems immaterial.
Moreover, the issue is usually not raised below because the
trial court apparently has jurisdiction. Thus, a juvenile and domestic relations court has power in some but not all cases-and the
limits are not clearly defined-to award financial support for a wife
against her husband. 76 Such was the situation in Caravella v.
Caravella,7 7 in which on appeal from an award of support by that
court the defendant-husband challenged the trial court's jurisdiction for the first time, arguing that where there was a consensual
separation the support order was beyond that court's statutory
powers.7 8 The appellate division upheld the challenge but under
the rule proceeded to a determination on the merits.7 9 Finding for
11Thus, for example, the number of civil cases filed with the county district courts for
the court years 1969-1970 was 215,491; for 1970-1971, 237,548; for 1971-1972, 239,213;
and for 1972-1973, 251,743; as compared with the following totals for the law division of the
superior court and the county courts for the same years: 33,892, 32,324, 31,107, and 31,750.
The figures for the juvenile and domestic relations courts for the same years were: 85,770,
88,670, 99,270, and 103,259, compared with the following for the chancery division, matrimonial, of the superior court for those years: 11,041, 13,349, 17,940, and 22,933. ANNUAL
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76 See D. HERR & J. LODGE, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION,
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(3d ed. 1963, Supp. 1974).
11 36 N.J. Super. 447, 116 A.2d 481 (App. Div. 1955).
718Id. at 449-50, 116 A.2d at 482.*
79 Id. at 453, 116 A.2d at 484. Judge Clapp was not deeply troubled by the jurisdictional
challenge:
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the husband in that respect as well-there was' error in the trial
proceedings-it remanded the case for a new trial, directing that
the wife be given an opportunity to move for transfer to the
proper court, the chancery division of the superior court, for
further proceedings on an amended complaint.8 0
In such a case no great problem is presented. Not only is the
trial court acting in a kind of case typically within its cognizance
and the challenge belated, but, after the appellate disposition, the
matter rests in the same posture it would have, had a reversal been
based solely on the issue of jurisdiction-a remand with an order
for new trial. Additionally, there is the advantage of curing the
case of further error, thus rendering it more likely that the second
trial will be final.
Such a course does represent a departure from a pure application of the customary American principle since it involves some
consideration of the merits of the controversy after a discovery of a
basic jurisdictional deficiency. But the departure is minimal: The
determination results in a disavowal of the prior finding on the
merits. What the Transfer of Causes Rule does accomplish in this
kind of case is the speedy transmittal of papers from court to court,
saving plaintiff the tedious task of suing anew in a right court
following a perfunctory dismissal in the wrong court. In these
circumstances the rule works essentially in the same way as it does
in the cases of transfer before hearing and determination either at
trial or upon appeal, as a purely procedural device governing the
orderly transmittal and acceptance of legal papers.
A different problem is presented when a judgment for defendant in a kind of case typically within the cognizance of the trial
court is affirmed on the merits after a belated challenge to its
jurisdiction. In this circumstance, the jurisdictional issue is most
likely to be raised by the court-a winning defendant will ordinarily desire to retain the fruits of victory and the losing plaintiff will
ordinarily be oblivious of or hesitant to raise error which he had
invited. But whether raised by the court on its own motion or a not
so hesitant plaintiff, the usual American rule on jurisdiction demands invalidation of the judgment. In this case, then, an application of the second paragraph of the New Jersey court rule operates
on a more than procedural basis by authorizing the determination
[T]he fact that jurisdiction over the subject matter lies, not in the court below, but
in another court in the state, is not as serious a matter as it once was. .... Under
R.R. 1:27D(b), we may deal with the case as though it had been brought in the court
(the Superior Court) authorized to act under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-24.
Id.
80 Id. at 454, 116 A.2d at 484.
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of the appeal on the merits and a remand to the proper court for
the entry of the appropriate judgment.
This is what the appellate court in Vorhies v. Cannizzaros ' purported to do. The defendants had obtained a jury verdict of no
cause for action in a suit brought in the county district court, but
the.trial judge set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial. Leave
to take the interlocutory appeal was granted. The appellate division vacated the new trial order and found for the defendants on
the merits, deciding that judgment on the verdict, though void,
should be entered not in the county district court but rather in the
82
county court.
In examining the record on appeal, the court had discovered
that plaintiffs, a woman suing for personal injuries and her husband suing per quod, had demanded damages in a sum beyond the
monetary limits of the county district court. 3 Therefore, it held,
the trial court "did not have jurisdiction, and since the jurisdiction
here deals with subject matter, as distinguished from parties, it
cannot be waived or conferred-even by consent. '8 4 Then, having
quick recourse to the rule, it ordered the entry of judgment for the
defendant in the proper court, the county court, whose jurisdiction
does not depend on monetary limits.
The effect of the rule in such a case is almost miraculous-a
jury verdict for a defendant returned in a court without jurisdiction becomes alive and working. Almost miraculous, but not quite.
All is explicable by natural causes-by virtue of a magnificent legal
transplant, the voice of the right court utters the private determinations of the wrong court. Through the power of the law the
dumb speak.
But of course this is not what has really happened at all.
Under the cloak of the legal fiction that the judgment of the wrong
court is really the judgment of the right court, the rule has operated to legitimatize the only judgment there is-that of the wrong
court. In other words, the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction
over the subject matter was not in this case void. What it decided
was affirmed and validated. And the court decided that way in
Vorhies because under the circumstances of the case it was fair and
proper to do so. The action was one ordinarily cognizable in the
county district court-an action for damages for personal injuries
arising out of a complaint at law in negligence, tried without
81

12
83
84

66 N.J. Super. 551, 169 A.2d 702 (App. Div. 1961).
Id. at 553, 560-61, 169 A.2d at 703, 707-08.
Id. at 560, 169 A.2d at 707.

Id.
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challenge to the jurisdictional capacity of that court and terminating in a verdict indisputably within that capacity. Not only was it
fair to hold the plaintiffs to ajudgment on this verdict, but it would
have been a waste of judicial time and energy to do otherwise.
Justice and expediency meet. And therefore, contrary to what the
court said, the element of waiver or consent of the parties was
relevant, and the usual rule that waiver or consent does not confer
jurisdiction was not applied. Perhaps it might have been preferable
had the court in Vorhies simply decided that under the circumstances plaintiffs were, by proceeding to trial, deemed to have
waived their demand for damages in excess of the monetary limits
of the trial court. Such a holding would have saved the jurisdiction
of the county district court and obviated the necessity of resorting
to the artificial technique of the rule.
In Scott v. Bodnar,a5 such an evasion was not possible. There
the appellate division reversed a county district court judgment for
defendant which had barred recovery for personal injuries on the
ground of a release. The appellate court ordered the entry in the
appropriate county court of partial judgment declaring the release
invalid.8 6 The trial as to the release's validity, though recognized by
the trial court as an equitable issue to be determined by a judge not
a jury, was not within its competence at all. At that time it lacked
the power to try an equitable issue. 8 7 As in the preceding cases, the
failure in jurisdiction had not been raised below and there was in
the circumstances a basis for the trial court's mistaken assumption
of jurisdiction. The case had been started in the county court,
which did have the power of trying an incidental equitable issue,88
but had apparently been transferred under a then frequently
utilized statute to the county district court for trial, since it was
considered likely that the case would terminate in a money judgment within that court's monetary limits. 8 9 And the judge, trying
" 52 N.J. Super. 439, 145 A.2d 643 (App. Div. 1958), cert. denied, 29 N.J. 136, 148 A.2d
650 (1959).
"6 52 N.J. Super. at 441, 449, 145 A.2d at 644, 649. While the appellate division
remanded the cause to the county court for entry of partial judgment concerning the
release', it ordered the re-transfer of the case to the county district court for a jury trial by
that court on the remaining issues, all legal in nature. Id. at 450, 145 A.2d at 650.
87 See id. at 441, 445, 145 A.2d at 645, 647. Until the 1961 decision in Vineland
Shopping Center, Inc. v. De Marco, 35 N.J. 459, 173 A.2d 270, the county district courts
could not determine any equitable issues. Now, the county district court must accept any
equitable issue offered to defeat an action or to avoid a separate defense to an action. See
note 47 supra. Accord, Citizen's First Nat'l Bank v. Brierley, 98 N.J. Super. 497, 500-01, 237
A.2d 885, 887 (App. Div. 1968).
88

N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 4,

89

This practice was authorized by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-47.1 (Supp. 1974-75),

5. See note 45 supra.
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the case in'the county district court, was a county court judge
temporarily assigned there. 90 In this situation the judgment, to be
preserved, must in form be that of a court properly having jurisdiction. And this must be so, as long as it is insisted as a matter of
form that a court lacking jurisdiction cannot validly enter a judgment. But again, the reality in this kind of case is otherwise: That
judgment will in substance be given validity where no one has
raised an objection to the jurisdiction below and the court proceeded on the assumption of authority.
We have been discussing cases where the jurisdictional
deficiency of a trial court apparently having authority is first raised
or noticed on appeal. We have already covered reviews on the
merits which result in a reversal and grant of a new trial
(Caravelld),91 vacation of a new trial order and direction of judgment on a jury verdict for defendant (Vorhies), 92 and reversal of
final judgment for defendant and order for entry of partial judgment for plaintiff (Scott). 93 More substantial problems are pre-

sented when a review on the merits, whether after an affirmance or
a reversal of the judgment below, results in an order for final
judgment for the plaintiff. Whereas a judgment for defendant
ordinarily involves only a finding of no basis for relief, a judgment
for plaintiff involves not only a fiiding of entitlement to relief but
ordinarily its award. It may be the type of relief granted that is
beyond the court's power, or, in the case of money damages,
merely the amount. In the former instance, it may be that only in
certain cases the court is unable to afford the remedy. For example, a county court may not generally have the power to construe
the language of a will or trust, but may do so where the resolution
of that issue is a necessary prerequisite to the grant of some further
relief which it is empowered to afford; as in the case of a proceedformerly Law of September 14, 1953, ch. 394, 1, [1953] N.J. Laws 2032, as amended, Law of
April 5, 1955, ch. 7,
1, [1955] N.J. Laws 32. The supreme court, in reaction to certain
abuses, adopted a rule amending the statute, drastically curtailing thereby the practice by
adding the requirement that no transfer down may be ordered unless "all parties waive trial
by jury and agree to be bound by the jurisdictional limits applicable to actions initially
instituted in the county district court." N.J.R. 4:3-4(a). Quaere: Is this a legitimate exercise of
the supreme court's rule-making power? Is the restriction on the trial court's power to
transfer a matter of practice and procedure? Of court administration?
90 52 NJ. Super. at 441, 145 A.2d at 644. The confusion of the trial judge is reflected
in his statement, while sitting in the county district court, that " 'County Courts now are
authorized to administer equity as well as law.'" He proceeded to decide the equitable issues.
Id. at 445, 145 A.2d at 647.
'1 See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
92 See notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 85-96 supra and accompanying text.
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ing for approval of a final accounting and order for distribution of
an estate. 94 Thus, it may sometimes happen that a county court
may proceed to utter such a construction in a case where its
jurisdiction is only apparent.
But does the county court have the power to construe a will in
connection with a proceeding for approval of an intermediate
accounting? The executors in In re Schmidt9 5 considered it helpful
to receive such a construction from the court and expeditious to
combine the suit with a petition for approval of an intermediate
accounting. 96 A hearing was held in the probate division of the
county court which allowed the accounting and construed the will
in such a way as to affect adversely the testator's widow and favor
other beneficiaries. 97 The widow appealed in her individual capacity and, for the first time, raised the issue of the lower court's
jurisdiction. 98 Since the will construction was not necessary for the
approval of the accounting, she argued, the county court's incidental equitable jurisdiction could not be invoked. 99 Consequently, that
court was without power to construe the will in that proceeding,
even though concededly the very same court could later give the
very same construction at the time of final accounting and
distribution.10 0 The appellate division declined to decide the issue
of the lower court's jurisdiction.' 0 l In a questionable exercise of its
power of original jurisdiction granted under the 1947 constitution
and the rules of court, the appellate division decided the case on
the merits and affirmed the county court's judgment. 10 2 Again one
" See In re Bibinski, 73 N.J. Super. 163, 165, 179 A.2d 185, 186 (Camden County Ct.),
aff'd sub nom. Wright v. Dzienis, 77 N.J. Super. 455, 187 A.2d 8 (App. Div. 1962). See
generally A. CLAPP, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION, 7 N.J. PRACTICE § 1911 (3d ed. 1962).
" 46 N.J. Super. 369, 134 A.2d 810 (App. Div. 1957).
96 Id. at 374, 134 A.2d at 812.
91 Id. at 374-75, 134 A.2d at 812-13. The lower court's opinion is reported at 38 N.J.
Super. 524, 119 A.2d 786 (Hudson County Ct. 1956).
98 46 N.J. Super. at 375, 134 A.2d at 813.
99 Id. at 378, 134 A.2d at 815. For cases discussing the incidental equitable jurisdiction
of the county court see note 45 supra.
"' 46 N.J. Super. at 378, 134 A.2d at 815.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 379-81, 134 A.2d at 815-17. The sources of the court's original jurisdiction are
section 5, paragraph 3 of article 6 in the 1947 constitution and N.J.R.R. 1:5-4, the present
N.J.R. 2:10-5. This power is solely ancillary to the court's appellate jurisdiction. The
constitutional provision allows the supreme court and appellate division only to "exercise
such original jurisdiction as may be necessary to the complete determination of any cause on
review." N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 5,
3 (emphasis added).
This 1947 constitutional provision has been traced to prior provisions in an unsuccessful
1944 proposal, a 1942 draft constitution, the unsuccessful 1909 constitutional amendment,
and the English Judicature Act of 1873. See State v. Ferrell, 29 N.J. Super. 183, 185, 102
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cannot quarrel with the realities of the case. After all, there was a
full hearing below on the merits, conducted without objection and
with full participation of all the parties before a court which under
some circumstances has the power to hear such a controversy. As
in Vorhies and Scott, there was the appearance of authority, based
upon the frequent exercise of the power to construe in similar
circumstances and the uncontested exercise of this apparent authority. No compelling countervailing reasons appearing, the appellate court in Schmidt, as in Vorhies and Scott, proceeded to hear
and determine the case on the merits and, in effect, affirmed,
resorting in this case to the ill-fitting guise of "original jurisdiction"
rather than to the more usual cloak afforded by the Transfer of
Causes Rule. The result is the same; only the technique of disposition differs. It may be inferred that in Schmidt had the rule allowing appellate determination on the merits been invoked, the appellate division would have applied it.
Schmidt involved, in effect, an affirmance of a judgment below
for the plaintiff-executors and certain defendant-beneficiaries. It
probably would have made no difference, insofar as the jurisdictional question was concerned, had the appellate court in its disposition reversed the judgment below and entered judgment for the
defendant-widow. The other beneficiaries in that case, there losing,
could not very well complain. They, together with the executors,
who had invited the error below, had sought to preserve the fruits
of the judgment on appeal. Nor would it probably have made any
difference if the case had originally been decided in favor of the
widow and the appellate court had reversed in favor of these other
beneficiaries.
In all the preceding cases, challenge to the jurisdiction of the
trial court was raised only on appeal. A different case was preA.2d 70, 71-72 (App. Div. 1954). Writing in Ferrell, Judge Clapp demonstrated the ancillary
nature of this "necessary" original jurisdiction by noting that the language of its predecessor
sources was an original jurisdiction "incident to" or "incidental to" the appellate jurisdiction.
Id. For an overview of this area see Schnitzer, Civil Practice and Procedure, 9 RUTGERS L. REv.
307, 324-25 (1954).
If the trial court was without jurisdiction of the subject matter, as Mrs. Schmidt argued,
and if the transfer of causes rule is not invoked, then under the prevailing doctrine the
proceedings of the trial court are void and of no consequence. Thus there is really nothing
in that case before the appellate division to review. Its jurisdiction is limited to the narrow
point of considering and determining the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court. Should the
appellate division instead consider and determine the case on the merits, it is indeed
exercising original jurisdiction in the matter-not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction but
instead of it. As Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
175 (1803): "It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects
the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause."
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sented in Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressersand Cosmetologists' International Union of America, Local 687 v. Pollino,'0 3 in which the challenge, though timely made and sustained in the trial court, was
essentially disregarded by the appellate court, in great part due to
the provisions of the rule and the peculiar circumstances of the
case. The facts are as follows: A barbers' union sought by complaint filed in the county district court to replevy its union cards
from defendant barbershop owners.'0 4 Under the then governing
statute, 10 5 that court had jurisdiction, replevin being an action at
law, if the cards to be replevied were worth $1,000 or less. At the
conclusion of the plaintiff's case, defendants moved to dismiss on
the grounds the plaintiff had failed to prove that the cards were
worth less than the jurisdictional limit, and had thereby, under
their view of controlling precedents, failed to carry its burden of
proving a jurisdictional basis for the action. 10 6 In fact, plaintiff had
offered no evidence as to value. Instead, in response to defendants'
argument, it asked the court to take judicial notice of the cards'
obviously nominal value and argued in reply that the burden was
on defendants to prove that they were of value greater than the
jurisdictional limits.

10 7

Defendants countered that their value was

obviously greater than the limits because of their symbolic worth
but offered no supporting proof.10 8 The court reserved decision
on the motion, took further testimony from defendants on the
merits and finished the case. Some weeks later it issued its opinion
that judgment was to be entered for the defendant both on the
merits and for lack of jurisdiction.' 0 9 The plaintiff appealed and
lOS 39 N.J. Super. 250, 120 A.2d 767 (App. Div.), aff'd, 22 N.J. 389, 126 A.2d 194
(1956). In the supreme court's opinion there is no reference to the jurisdictional issue except
in the dissent of Justice Heher. 22 N.J. at 402-05, 126 A.2d at 202-03. Justice Heher argued
that the county district court did not have jurisdiction since the action was not really one at
law in replevin but rather one concerning "the relations of the parties involving equitable
principles." Id. at 404, 126 A.2d at 203.
104 39 N.J. Super. at 253-54, 120 A.2d at 768.
105 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-34 (1952), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-34 (Supp.
1974-75). The former statute conferred jurisdiction on the county district court in replevin
actions "where the value of the goods or chattels of which replevin is sought does not exceed
the value of $1,000." In 1969 the amount was raised to the present $3,000. For a discussion
of the effect of the amended statute on recovery in county district court actions instituted
prior to amendment but tried subsequent to it see Avon Sheet Metal Co. v. Heritage House
Associates, 107 N.J. Super. 487, 489-92, 259 A.2d 241, 242-44 (Essex County Dist. Ct.
1969).
106 Appendix to Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 56a-57a, Journeymen Barbers Local
687 v. Pollino, 39 N.J. Super. 250, 120 A.2d 767 (App. Div. 1956) [hereinafter cited as
Appellant's Appendix].
107 Appellant's Appendix, supra note 106, at 58a-59a.
10s Id. at 63a.
109 Id. at 6a-lla.
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the defendants again argued both the merits and the jurisdictional
issue.
It was of course an anomaly to have a judgment on the merits
from a court which considered itself without jurisdiction to enter
such a judgment, particularly when such a determination turned
on the subordinate issue of the allocation of the burden of proof. It
is not surprising that under these circumstances the appellate court
passed over the jurisdictional problem and went to the merits,
upon which it reversed the trial court.1 1 0 It might have held that on
the facts lack of power had not been established. Instead it stated,
referring to the jurisdictional issue, that "[u]nder our present appellate practice . . . this is a matter of minor concern,"

'

to be

disposed of under the rule after resolving the substantive questions. And only after having disposed of the merits, did it return to
the problem of jurisdiction. The court considered but rejected the
alternative of a conditional remand to the district court for the
taking of proof to supplement the unsatisfactory trial record concerning the value of the cards and, upon a finding of value in
excess of the limits, for the transfer to the superior court for the
entry of judgment for replevin therein. Instead, it simply directed
the entry of judgment in the county district court.'" 2
Thus, if we read Journeymen in the light of its facts, we may
say that regardless of the language used, the general rule on lack
of jurisdiction was soundly held not to apply where, as there, the
jurisdiction of the trial court was not challenged until trial; such
jurisdiction turned on a question of fact, the monetary value of the
relief sought; the evidence introduced suggested jurisdiction, and
contrary evidence, though readily available, was not introduced;
and the judgment of non-jurisdiction was entered by the trial court
some weeks after the conclusion of the trial on the merits and
accompanied a judgment on the merits. Under these circumstances, considerations of proper economic utilization of judicial
110 39 N.J. Super. at 262-63, 120 A.2d at 773.

Id. at 254, 120 A.2d at 768-69. The court further stated:
If the cause is cognizable, not in that court, but in some other trial court in the
State, we nevertheless should endeavor to resolve the substantial questions; however, we then, through our mandate, will direct judgment on our conclusions to be
entered in a court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter.
Id. (citation omitted).
112 Id. at 263, 120 A.2d at 773. In rejecting a remand for the taking of proof as to
value,
the court stated:
It would be unfortunate if we had to send the case back to the County District
Court to take evidence as to the value of the cards and then-if the cards were
found to be worth more than $1,000-to transfer the case to the Superior Court,
just for the purpose of entering a judgment on our mandate.
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time and effort pragmatically dictate that the jurisdictional challenge be denied and the case decided on the merits. Nor could the
defendant complain. Surely if he had been bent on trial in the
superior court, he should have moved before trial, with supporting
affidavits in proof of excessive value, for a transfer to that court.
He has only himself to blame if he trusts to raising this issue in the
midst of trial-without benefit of supporting proof-in the fastmoving county district court. Essentially the appellate court, by its
decision, cast the burden of such proof on the defendant and
determined that lack of jurisdiction had not been shown.
But the unqualified suggestion in the opinion that the question
of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction was now, under the rule, to
be "a matter of minor concern" is misleading. It happened to be so
in the circumstances of that case, but to regard such an issue in any
case as essentially a matter of practice and procedure, regardless of
considerations of fairness, legislative policy, and the sound administration of the courts, would lead to unjust conclusions and
chaotic practices. Surely, had the defendants prior to trial presented convincing proof to the county district court that the value
of the cards was far beyond the monetary limits of that court, the
posture of the case would have been significantly different. Further
proceedings in that instance would have been without color of
authority over a litigant's timely objection. Even under the rule,
lack of jurisdiction becomes then a matter of major concern, as we
shall shortly see.
Returning to the review, we may say that in all the foregoing
cases, the power of the trial court to adjudicate was upheld and its
judgment given validity despite the various challenges to jurisdiction either (a) by declining to examine into the alleged invalidity
(Schmidt, Journeymen);113 (b) by validating the supposed (Vorhies)' 1 4
or real (Scott) 11 5 invalidity by resort to the transfer mechanism of
the rule; or (c) by reversing on the merits and remanding with
orders for a new trial and possible transfer (Caravella).'1 6 In each
case, the authority of the court or the judge to proceed was apparent, or at least not disestablished, and the challenge either belated
or ineffectual. In none of these cases would it probably have made
any difference had the challenge, though made at the trial level,
been interposed for the first time after the case had gone to
113
14
"

See notes 95-112 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 85-90 supra and accompanying text.

116See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
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judgment. A timely and effective challenge, however, alters the
basic nature of the case, as we shall see in the following sections.
Cases of Modification: Timely Challenge
to UnauthorizedJudgments
The interposition of a timely challenge not only dissipates the
illusion of apparent authority, but also forces the trial court to face
the fact that it may be acting beyond the limits of its powers as
established by the constitution or by legislation, thereby possibly
exposing the challenger to an unnecessary trial, an unauthorized
judgment, or both.
Where the lack of jurisdiction goes not to the trial itself but
only to some aspect of the judgment, the challenge is perforce
post-judgmental. Under these circumstances, the challengethough timely-will come late, and the remedy, seeking to save the
unchallenged trial and the essence of the determination on the
merits, will be to modify rather than totally invalidate the judgment
below. A typical case of such challenge is that presented to the
entry of judgment in the county district court in excess of its
jurisdictional monetary limits.
One such case was that of Reiser v. Simon. 1 17 There, contractors
brought suit against homeowners for damages in the sum of $250,
the balance due on the contract and held in escrow. The escrow
agent was also named a defendant and subsequently deposited the
$250 in court under an interpleader. The owners, besides claiming
the $250 in response to the interpleader, counterclaimed for $1,000
in damages against the contractors for poor workmanship. 1 8 Following trial, the court awarded the deposit to the owners, denied
the contractors' claim and upheld the counterclaim of the owners,
entering judgment for them in the sum of $250 on the interpleader and the sum of $1,000 on the counterclaim. On appeal,
judgment on the interpleader was affirmed, but judgment on the
counterclaim was reduced from $1,000 to $750 despite the "important jurisdictional question" raised by the plaintiffs.' 1 9
The appellate court did not advert to the transfer rule, but the
tenor of its opinion was such as to lead to the conclusion that, had
its applicability been raised, it would have been denied. The continued maintenance of the county district court as a court with
definite limits on monetary recovery was at stake. Such a position is
63 N.J. Super. 297, 164 A.2d 650 (App. Div. 1960).
8 Id. at 299-300, 164 A.2d at 651.
19 Id. at 301, 304. 164 A.2d at 652-53.
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not at odds with that taken in Vorhies. 12 0 There also, the jurisdiction
of the county district court to try a demand in excess of the
monetary limits was unchallenged during trial, but the appellate
court saved both the judgment and the jurisdiction of the trial
court by resort to the transfer rule. Theoretically, of course, the
Vorhies result seems to countenance an evasion of the county district court; but in practice both Vorhies and Reiser may be reconciled
on these grounds: a claimant going to trial on an excessive demand
will be deemed to have tried the claim on the merits within the
jurisdictional limits and will be deprived of any excess in the verdict by an appropriate modification of judgment, even though the
excess in demand was not challenged during trial. In both cases
then, primary consideration was given to the legislative policy establishing the monetary limits of the court's trial jurisdiction. In
Reiser, this consideration outweighs the resultant unfairness to the
claimant, and pragmatism operates to save the fruits of trial by
trimming the recovery, instead of, by resort to the transfer rule as
in Vorhies, ordering a transfer and entry of the judgment elsewhere.
In Reiser, the extent of the jurisdictional limits was not clear at
the time the case was tried, 121 and the claims were not obviously
beyond the power of the court to try. Nevertheless, the appellate
court did not consider this a pertinent factor; a claimant guessing
wrongly is yet bound by the limits. In Vorhies, the claimants in
See notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
164 A.2d at 652. Indeed this opinion served only to
becloud the law still further. For a typical view of the soundness of this decision as to limits
on counterclaims in the county district court see R. McDoNOUGH, COUNTY DISTRICT AND
MUNICIPAL COURTS, 17 N.J. PRACTICE § 175, at 80-81 & n.44 (2d ed. 1971).
The decision is also difficult to reconcile with the alternate holding in Kingsley v. Wes
Outdoor Advertising Co., 55 N.J. 336, 339, 262 A.2d 193, 194-95 (1970), construing the
provisions of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-34 (1952), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-34(a)
(Supp. 1974-75), which authorizes a penalty action in the district court "where the debt,
balance, penalty, damage or other matter in dispute does not exceed, exclusive of costs, the
sum or value of $1,000." (Emphasis added.) The supreme court held that the county district
court had jurisdiction under that statute to entertain an action by the plaintiff, a state
official, seeking to recover a total of 576 separate penalties involving 576 separate but
substantially related statutory violations. The court noted that the plaintiff could have
brought 576 separate suits and had them consolidated for trial. "In practical reality, the suit
was not for a single penalty in excess of $1,000 but, as noted; for 576 penalties, no one of
which exceeded $1,000." 55 N.J. at 340, 262 A.2d at 195. The court also held that the
county district court had additional jurisdiction to entertain an action for a penalty affecting
the removal of an outdoor advertising sign under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:40-67 et seq. (1960)
and that the $1,000 monetary limit in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-34 (1952) did not apply to
this statute. 55 N.J. at 339, 262 A.2d at 194. The opinion did not cite the decision in
Ricciardi v. Rabin, 79 N.J. Super. 7, 190 A.2d 196 (App. Div. 1963), although the cases are
in accord. Ricciardi is discussed at notes 122-30 infra and accompanying text.
110

111 See 63 N.J. Super. at 301,
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demanding the sum of $5,000 were apparently asserting damages
beyond the authority of the county district court, but that case was
saved by a zero verdict. Would it have made a difference had they
recovered a verdict equal to their demand? Would the lack of
challenge before or during trial be relevant? Should the rule of
court then apply, enabling the county district court to transfer the
cause for entry of judgment, in accordance with the demands, to a
court having no limits upon its award? There are no precedents
directly in point to guide us, but it is likely that in this occasional
situation, the appellate court would follow Reiser and reduce the
judgment to the permissible limits, rather than establish a precedent of validating the excess by using the transfer rule. In part,
such a precedent would render the county district court a trap for
the unwary. Its summary, informal practice would lead to unforseen results. And the occasional case of a deliberate disregard of
limits by bench and bar would not be countenanced.
A situation akin to this was involved in the case of Ricciardi v.
Rabin,' 22 in which the challenge based upon exceeding monetary
limits was not initially raised until after judgment. First let us state
the facts: The complaint sounded in negligence in six counts. Each
of the first four counts set forth a claim for personal injuries for a
member of the Ricciardi family, three infant sons and their
mother. In each of the fifth and sixth counts, the father/husband
pleaded per quod. Each count demanded an amount within the
jurisdictional limits of the court, but the total demanded in all six
counts exceeded the limits. 123 After a trial without a jury, the

plaintiffs recovered judgments against the defendant in amounts
which individually were less than, but in the aggregate more than,
the limits. Defendant thereupon moved before the trial judge for a
new trial upon the ground, raised for the first time, that the court
lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and, on the merits, that
the verdicts had been excessive. The motion was denied and de1

fendant appealed.

24

The appellate division unanimously agreed that the verdicts
were not excessive, but divided on the question of jurisdiction. Two
of the three-judge panel decided that the court below had jurisdiction under the pertinent statute.' 2 5 Since, they argued, the various
plaintiffs could have achieved the same result by suing separately
79 N.J. Super. 7, 190 A.2d 196 (App. Div. 1963).
Id. at 8, 190 A.2d at 196.
124 Brief for Plaintiff at 2, Ricciardi v. Rabin, 79 N.J. Super. 7, 190 A.2d 196 (App. Div.
122
123

1963) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Brief].
125 79 N.J. Super. at 8, 190 A.2d at 196.
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and trying their cases together under an order of consolidation,
the term "action" in the statute, limiting the county district court's
jurisdiction to an action up to $3,000 in negligence, must in effect
mean "claim. ' 2 6 They distinguished Vorhies, in which they said the
complaint had been "incompetently drawn and consisted of a
single count in which the husband and wife jointly sued for $5,000,
lumping their claims indiscriminately," whereas in Ricciardi the
claims were segregated.1 27 The third judge considered the case to
be, under the statute, clearly beyond the trial court's jurisdiction.
He viewed the majority's position as an unwarranted extension of
the statutory language and an unwarranted intrusion upon the
legislative domain which includes provision for the jurisdiction of
the inferior courts.1 28 But then, having thus strictly construed the
statute so as to adjudge the trial court without power to determine
the claims, he voted for the more radical alternative-the employment of the provisions of paragraph (b) of the rule, thereby, upon
the supposed authority of Vorhies, directing the entry of the judg129
ment of the county district court in the superior court.
With this suggestion we have stepped into the realm of the
unreal. For if the concurring opinion be sound, that under the
statute the county district court in Ricciardi lacked jurisdiction to
try such a complaint and to enter judgment in the amounts there
demanded, this deficiency was present from the beginning of the
trial, through the taking of testimony, to the final determination.
While it is true such deficiency had not been raised prior to judgSee id. at 8-9, 190 A.2d at 196-97. At that time the controlling statute, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:6-34 (1952), provided:
Every action of a civil nature at law, other than a proceeding in lieu of a
prerogative writ ...where the damage or other matter in dispute does not exceed,
exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $1,000, shall be cognizable in the county
district courts of this state.
Plaintiffs and the trial court had also relied on a directive and memorandum on
aggregation of claims circulated to the presiding judges of the various county district courts
by the administrative director of the courts. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 124, at 2. A copy of
the aforementioned memorandum can be found in Plaintiff's Brief, Appendix, supra note
124, at P-la. The appellate division, however, made no mention of these interpretative
statements in its opinion.
After this case was decided, the legislature codified the result in Ricciardi by a statute
permitting the aggregation of claims "in actions for damages resulting from negligence."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-34.1 (Supp. 1974-75). Quaere: Does the rather specific authorization
for aggregation in negligence actions mean that the legislature disapproves such a course in
other actions, such as products liability suits? Probably not; but the legislature's habit of
piecemeal codification of prior decisions does impose a heavier burden on the judiciary in
later cases to elaborate satisfactory reasons for its determinations.
127 79 N.J. Super. at 9, 190 A.2d at 197.
121 Id. at 10-11, 190 A.2d at 197-98.
829 Id. at 10, 190 A.2d at 197.
826
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ment, the trial court in entering judgment in excess of the statutory
limits could not but act in disregard of those limits. And by so
doing, it would have intruded without warrant upon the legislative
domain, the assignment of jurisdictional limits for an inferior
court-the very thing the opinion accused the majority of doing in
construing the statute broadly. To apply the rule in such a situation, as the concurring judge would have done, is to lend validity to
usurpation.
Error lay not in perceiving that the rule speaks in terms of
fiction, but in that the fiction is serviceable only in furtherance of
certain underlying policies such as the validation of a judgment
of a court operating with unchallenged apparent authority. This
was the situation in Vorhies which the concurrence purported to
follow. But that case was distinguishable from Ricciardi for a much
more basic reason than that mentioned by the majority. Although
in both cases the trial proceeded without challenge to the supposed
jurisdictional defect-the possibility of a verdict within the limits of
the complaint's demand, but beyond the jurisdictional limits of the
court-such possibility was erased in Vorkies in the actuality of a
zero verdict, whereas in Ricciardi, under the concurring view, it was
realized in the verdict. Thus, the zero verdict in Vorhies was in fact
within the legislatively established limits of the county district
court, whereas the allegedly excessive verdict of Ricciardi could not
be.
Of course, a substantial argument can be made in support of
the concurring position. Ricciardi was not a clear case of an excessive demand. There was a basis, eventually supported by the majority, for contending that the demands were authorized under the
statute. And again, the challenge was belated. Under these circumstances then, the trial court had not acted in cavalier disregard of
its authority, and considerations of fairness and conservation of
judicial resources require that the defendant be considered to have
waived his jurisdictional defense. As a practical matter the judgment is preserved through the employment of the transfer rule,
rendering it a judgment of the county court rather than the county
district court.
But such an argument would make considerations of fairness
and pragmatism weightier than that of fidelity to legislative policy.
And that the concurrence seemed unwilling to do. Moreover, the
argument seems at odds with the approach taken by the appellate
division in Reiser. There the court, we saw, faced with a similar
situation-an excessive judgment following a belatedly challenged
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excessive demand in an action whose jurisdictional limits were
unclear-struck the excess, saving thereby the judgment and the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Fidelity to legislative policy Was indeed the supreme consideration. Fairness yielded. And pragmatism worked to trim the judgment, thus saving the jurisdiction
but not the fruits of victory.
The danger then of the concurrence is that not only does it
work at cross-purposes, elevating and then degrading legislative
policy; but it does so by the use of a fiction to achieve a pragmatic
and fair result without so stating. Its reasoning removed from its
context could justify a similar employment no matter how palpable
the excess and timely the challenge. Some such application was
sought and decisively rejected in Andriola v. Galloping Hill Shopping
Center, Inc.130 Plaintiff, suing in the county district court for personal injuries, had asked for $3,000 in damages and received a jury
verdict for $8,000. Thereafter she moved in the trial court, pursuant to paragraph (a) of the rule, for a transfer of the case to the
county court or superior court so that judgment might be entered
there in the sum of $8,000. Thus this case differs from those
preceding in that it is the plaintiff who, challenging the jurisdiction
of the court in which the case was tried, seeks the benefit of the
transfer rule. The trial court denied the motion, reduced the
verdict to $3,000 and ordered judgment to be entered in that
amount. 131 Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the county district
court, having lost jurisdiction upon return of the $8,000 verdict,
should have transferred the case below under paragraph (a) of the
rule and that, in default thereof, the appellate division should
1 32
order the transfer to a proper court under paragraph (b).
The appellate division held, however, that the trial court had
jurisdiction, a suit at law for personal injuries, and that there were
absolute jurisdictional limits on the amount recoverable there "regardless of what the trier of facts may determine the actual damages to be. '1

33

It further held that a transfer after a verdict could

not be effected under the rule. for the purpose of entering a
judgment on a verdict in excess of the limits. To do that would
practically destroy the county district court as a place for the
inexpensive and expeditious disposition of the many relatively
minor cases which comprise the vast bulk of litigation in the state.
93
Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
130
131

N.J. Super. 196, 225 A.2d 377 (App. Div. 1966).
at 198, 225 A.2d at 379.
at 199, 225 A.2d at 379.
at 201-02, 225 A.2d at 380-81.
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The limits on liability, it observed, limit the time and money likely
to be spent by defense counsel in the preparation and trial of cases,
thereby affording a plaintiff quick and inexpensive justice.' 34 The
court regarded the disposition in Vorhies as equitable under the
concurcircumstances and followed the majority rather than the
1 35
below.
judgment
the
affirming
Ricciardi
in
ring opinion
Some conclusions would seem to follow. If, as in Andriola, a
jury verdict in excess of the limits does not oust the county district
court of jurisdiction where the demand for damages in. plaintiff's complaint was within the limits, but must instead be reduced
to these limits; and if as in Reiser, a judge's determination in excess
of the limits does not oust the court of jurisdiction even though
such judgment coincides with the amount demanded, and the trial
of the demand was unchallenged but must instead be reduced to
these limits; it should follow (though it was said not to in Vorhies)
that a jury verdict within the limits does not oust the court of
jurisdiction even though the plaintiff's demand was in excess. The
contrary opinion in Vorhies that an excessive demand takes the case
out of the court's jurisdiction and that the rule could save the fruits
of trial by effecting a post-judgmental transfer, followed by the
concurrence in Ricciardi, was in effect abandoned, though not
repudiated, in Andriola.
From Reiser and Andriola we may conclude further, despite the
suggestions in Vorhies and Ricciardi, that the courts will honor the
statutory policy restricting the amounts of recovery in the county
district court and will not permit the rule to be used so as to
validate judgments in excess of these limits. Thus, regardless of the
demands in the complaint, once a case is tried in the county district
court without challenge to its jurisdiction, the amount recovered
will be limited to its jurisdictional capability. Rather than tailoring
the jurisdiction to fit the judgment, the methodology sanctioned in
the rule by a transfer after appeal, these cases prescribe the opposite technique-tailoring the judgment to suit the jurisdiction. The
overriding consideration is the preservation of the county district
court as a readily available tribunal, affording quick and cheap
judgment in cases of limited value.
This tailoring the judgment through use of the technique of
"modification" is practical and defensible where, as in the cases
discussed in this section, the jurisdictional deficiency extends not to
the trial of a cause or issue, but to some aspect of the judgment
Id. at 201, 225 A.2d at 380.
l35 Id. at 204-05, 225 A.2d at 382.
134
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entered, such as the amount of damages awarded. The situation
would naturally be different were the county district court to try a
case in which a jurisdictional challenge had been timely made to a
demand clearly beyond the monetary limits. The situation is also
different when it is the type of case or the relief itself that is at
issue, where the parties and the court are on notice from the start
that the matter at hand is beyond the competence of the court to
try. In such a case, something beyond a modified order is required.
This we shall next discuss.
Cases of Invalidation: Timely Challenge to
the Unauthorized Hearing and Determination
The primary jurisdiction of the county district court is
confined to actions at law. Thus a complaint seeking solely such
extraordinary equitable relief as a mandatory injunction would be
beyond its competence and should, on defendant's challenge, be
transferred for trial to the chancery division of the superior court.
But failing this, what is an appellate court to do in view of the rule,
when faced with an appeal from a judgment granting an injunction? Modification in such a case is not a practical alternative. And
if the court decides the case on the merits, it validates in substance
the exercise of the lower court's jurisdiction and thereby encourages further similar excursions. There are rather strong arguments
against permitting this, one constitutional and one practical. The
first lies in the recognition that the county district court, being a
court of limited jurisdiction, is a creature of the legislature, and
that the various statutes of jurisdiction have not authorized that
court to afford primary equitable relief. 136 An exercise of such
power cannot be made under the cloak of apparent authority:
That court never has the power to award such relief. Therefore,
such an exercise amounts to judicial usurpation.1 3 7 The second lies
in the nature of the relief itself. An injunction is an extraordinary
remedy, affecting personal freedom. It is highly doubtful whether
a court of summary practice, burdened with a heavy trial
calendar 38 and accustomed to loose methodology, should be entrusted with this kind of power. Sound reflection suggests that the
award of the extraordinary remedy be confined to a court of
deliberation. 3 9 The conclusion would seem to follow that theoretiSee note 47 supra.
Cf. Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 328, 345-50 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
' See the statistics on the county district court caseload in note 75 supra.
"9 Circuit Justice Baldwin's caveat of almost 150 years ago still rings true today:
There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater
'

137
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cal and practical considerations join to require the invalidation of
such an order and a remand to the proper court for a new trial
without discussion of the merits. Once again, the controlling factor
lies not in the language of the rule itself, but in overriding policy
considerations.
There is no precedent directly in point confirming the above
analysis, but some support may be found in the decision in Knoblock
v. Knoblock. 140 There a wife seeking to collect arrearages from her
husband brought suit in the county district court. When the husband interposed as his sole defense the court's lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, she moved for and received summary
judgment for the amount due her, with the trial court denying the
14
husband's cross-motion for dismissal on the jurisdictional issue. '
The appellate division, in a summary three-sentence opinion, reversed the judgment for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case
with directions for a transfer, under the rule, to the chancery
142
division of the superior court.
Suits for support are of course matrimonial actions, cognizable
in the chancery division and involve the discretion of the trial court
as to whether changes in circumstances require a deviation from
the terms of the separation agreement.1 43 Discretion implies equitable powers foreign to actions at law. Thus, while the suit for
arrearages might superficially appear to be one within the county
district court's competence as being a routine action at law for debt,
the error upon challenge ought readily to be evident. An appellate
court cannot, without undermining the laws of jurisdiction,
countenance such a suit. It constitutes, more subtly than an action
caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case,
than the issuing [of] an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity, that never ought
to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an
adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.
Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R.R., 3 F. Cas. 821, 827 (No. 1617) (D.N.J. 1830).
140 119 N.J. Super. 432, 292 A.2d 35 (App. Div. 1972).
141 Appendix to Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 7-9, 12, 16-17, Knoblock v. Knoblock, 119 N.J. Super. 432, 292 A.2d 35 (App. Div. 1972).
142 119 N.J. Super. at 433, 292 A.2d at 35.
'1 The court in Knoblock relied on Bendler v. Bendler, 3 N.J. 161, 69 A.2d 302 (1949).
At common law, interspousal suits to enforce mutual promises could not be brought in a law
court. Relief, however, was available in equity. Id. at 168-69, 69 A.2d at 305. Cf. Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 495, 267 A.2d 481, 488 (1970), authorizing interspousal suit at law for
damages arising out of an automobile tort.
Knoblock made no reference to Timmerman v. Timmerman, 23 N.J. Misc. 52, 55, 41
A.2d 24, 26 (Dist. Ct. 1945), which had held that the county district court had no jurisdiction
to adjudge a suit for support arrearages. See also Tellian v. Healy, 60 N.J. Super. 539,
542-44, 159 A.2d 777, 778-79 (L. Div. 1960), transferring an action to recover arrearage-s for
child support provided for in an out-of-state divorce decree from the law division of the
superior court to the chancery division.
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for injunction in the county district court, a usurpation of authority.
The case closest to Knoblock is that of State v. Osborn.14 4 In
Osborn, the proceedings below were held invalid, not because-a
court had overreached its jurisdiction but rather because a tribunal
created by the executive had pretended to be part of the judiciary.
Yet there is a significant similarity. In each case the trial tribunal
had proceeded to try the action in the face of a challenge that the
matter was utterly beyond its competence.
These are the facts: Osborn was charged, tried and convicted
in the "Marine Navigation Court" of operating a power vessel in
145
state tidal waters in violation of the Tidal Waters Navigation Act,
which makes such an offense punishable by a fine of up to one
hundred dollars or ten days' imprisonment for a first offense, and
146
double the fine or imprisonment for a repeated violation.
The same act charged the Department of Conservation and
Economic Development in the executive branch of government
with the duty of enforcement;1 4 7 provided that a complaint might
be brought thereunder in any county court, county district court,
county criminal court, or municipal court; 148 and vested the commissioner of the Department, two of his named associates, and
such of their assistants as he might designate, with all the powers of
a magistrate of a municipal court. 149 Purportedly pursuant to this
last provision, the commissioner established the "Marine Navigation Court" and appointed as its "magistrate" one of his
150

assistants.

Pursuant to rule,' 5' Osborn appealed his conviction to the
county court and moved for dismissal of the judgment of the
"Marine Navigation Court" on the ground that that tribunal, not
being a part of the state's judicial system, lacked jurisdiction. The
county court, however, besides its appellate jurisdictioh which Os144

32 N.J. 117, 160 A.2d 42 (1960).

145 N.J. STAT. ANN.

§§ 12:7-44 to-53 (1968). The provision violated, section 12:7-47,

provides in pertinent part: "No power vessel shall be operated in a reckless manner."
146 Id. § 12:7-51.
147 Id. § 12:7-52. This section also provides that the procedure to be used for enforcement "shall be the same as in the case of other violations under Title 12 of the Revised
Statutes relating to . . .craft operating in other than tidal waters." These enforcement
provisions are set forth in id. §§ 12:7-34.31 to 34.
148 Id.
§ 12:7-34.31.
14' Law of Dec. 8. 1954, ch. 236, § 32, [1954] N.J. Laws 879 (repealed 1962).
150 32 N.J. at 125, 160 A.2d at 46-47.
151 N.J.R.R. 3:10-2 (corresponds to N.J.R. 3:23-2)
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born had invoked in taking the appeal, had by virtue of the above
mentioned statutory provision original jurisdiction to try the
charge.1 5 2 Thus, if it decided that the lower tribunal had lacked
jurisdiction, it could, it reasoned, proceed to hear the case in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. On the other hand, if it decided
the lower tribunal had jurisdiction, it would proceed to hear the
case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction with, as in the case
of an appeal from an inferior court to the county court, a plenary
hearing, i.e., trying the case from the beginning, as does a court
when it presides over a new trial.1 53 In either case the hearing
would be substantially the same. The court, considering it would
make no difference and considering the defendant's objection
under the circumstances to be a procedural one, waived under the
rules by his appeal, 154 rejected Osborn's challenge, heard the case
1 55
as an appeal on the merits, convicted him and exacted a fine.
On further appeal, the supreme court reversed the judgment
of the county court, holding it to be reversible error for that court
to exercise its appellate jurisdiction instead of dismissing the judg156
ment of the "Marine Navigation Court" for lack of jurisdiction.
It agreed that ordinarily an appeal to the county court waived any
procedural defect in the original trial, but added:
[T]he reach of the waiver provision of R. R. 3: 10-10(b) extends
only to procedural matters. It does not have the effect of curing
a lower court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, which
is not conferred by the defendant's waiver or implied consent.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power of a court to
hear and determine cases of the class to which the proceeding in
question belongs. It rests solely upon the court's having been
granted such power by the Constitution or by valid
legislation, and
157
cannot be vested by agreement of the parties.
The court further held that the legislature had never, by the
above statutory provisions, intended to establish a new court such
as the "Marine Navigation Court," but that, in vesting members of
the executive branch with the power of adjudication of statutory
violations concurrently given to certain named courts, it had vio152

See note 14 supra and accompanying text.

153 N.J.R.R. 3:10-10 (corresponds to N.J.R. 3:23-8).

Appeal of a criminal conviction effects a waiver of "any defect in, or the absence of,
any process or charge laid in the complaint." N.J.R. 3:23-8(c) (corresponds to N.J.R.R.
3:10-10(b)). [The former rules had omitted a comma; otherwise the texts are identical.]
1532 N.J. at 120, 160 A.2d at 44. The fine was, however, reduced from $100 to $25 by
the county court Id.
156 Id. at 128, 160 A.2d at 48.
157 Id. at 121-22, 160 A.2d at 45 (citations omitted).
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lated the separation of powers article in the 1947 constitution.15 8
Consequently, it held the conviction rendered by a member of the
executive branch purportedly sitting as a judicial magistrate to be a
nullity.' 59
The provisions of the Transfer of Causes Rule it refused to
apply. The rule, it said, referred only to "a court." The "Marine
Navigation Court" not being "a court," its "magistrate" could not
have utilized the rule in the first instance.160 Nor on appeal, therefore, could the county court; for the rule contemplated a real
court, not a bogus one. The state's pragmatic argument that it was
immaterial whether the "Marine Navigation Court" was bogus or
real since the county court which heard the case on the merits had
original jurisdiction under the statute was rejected. That jurisdiction, the supreme court stated, had not been invoked.' 6 ' Bent upon nullity, it ordered a dismissal of the complaint and remanded.
Osborn is unusual then in three respects: First, for its reversal of
the judgment below with a direction of subsequent dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction in the tribunal uttering the judgment; second,
for its rejection of the proposition that the case nonetheless should
be heard and decided on the merits and remanded for the entry of
judgment in a proper court; and third, for its reaffirmation of the
standard American rule of law, made official currency by
Cooley,' 6 2 that jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is
conferrable only by constitution or legislation, not by consent of the
parties.
This then is a second limitation to the overall application of
the Transfer of Causes Rule. For reasons of state, grounded in the
policy decision to safeguard the integrity of the judicial branch
from legislative and executive encroachment, the rule will not
apply to a tribunal pretending to be in and of the judiciary. The
rule will not extend to permit a transfer from such a tribunal to a
real court; it will not validate on appeal the tribunal's judgment;
and when the court on such appeal determines the case anew in its
appellate capacity rather than transferring the case to itself for trial
158 Id. at 126-27, 160 A.2d at 47-48. See N.J. CONST. art. 3, § 1. Cf. id. art. 6, § 6,
159 32 N.J. at 128, 160 A.2d at 48.
ld. at 123, 160 A.2d at 45-46.
I6
161

The court reasoned:

The complaint was not addressed to [the county court], and the State made no
attempt to institute proceedings before it in any other way. The jurisdiction of the
County Court was invoked only by way of the defendant's appeal, and thus it heard
the cause only in its appellate capacity.
Id. at 122, 160 A.2d at 45.
1'2 See note 7 supra.

1.
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in its original jurisdiction, the rule on further appeal will neither
validate such a judicial judgment nor consider the transfer as
having been made. 163 Such proceedings are void from beginning to
end. Worst of all, no further proceedings will be 'countenanced in
the original action. No remand to a proper court-only dismissal
with a subsequent new start-satisfied the supreme court.
There are circumstances other than outright usurpation and
reasons of state which may also require invalidation. For example,
a court's jurisdiction and the validity of its prior proceedings may
be timely challenged by an intervening party. Under such circumstances, a transfer without invalidation would be meaningless.
This was the case in In re Old Colony Coal Co.

164

Assignees of

the corporation under a deed of assignment for the benefit of
1 65
creditors had started proceedings in the Hudson County Court.
Having received an offer to sell the corporate assets, they filed a
petition with the court to accept it, giving notice to all creditors
except one.' 6 6 Following a hearing, the court entered an order
'13 Compare this restrictive validating policy with that followed by the supreme court in
State v. Saulnier, 63 N.J. 199, 306 A.2d 67 (1973). Overruling State v. McGrath, 17 N.J. 41,
110 A.2d 11 (1954), the court held that a county court judge could try together an
indictment and a nonindictable disorderly person complaint involving the same incident, on
the theory that jurisdiction lay in the superior court. 63 N.J. at 207-08, 306 A.2d at 70-71.
Where the indictable offense has as a lesser included offense a disorderly person charge, the
court stated that
[w]hether the ... indictment is tried by a Superior Court judge or a County Court
judge it is to be dealt with, at least for jurisdictional purposes, as a Superior Court
proceeding.
Id. at 207, 306 A.2d at 71. This is novel. Theretofore, it was generally understood, as in
McGrath, that the county judge trying criminal indictments sits of course in the county court
and, as held in McGrath, that court has no jurisdiction to try a disorderly person complaint.
See 17 N.J. at 52-53, 110 A.2d at 17. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3-4 (1952), conferring
jurisdiction on the county court only in criminal proceedings "of an indictable nature."
If this fine is pursued, Saulnier will take its place in New Jersey as a judicial evolutionary
leap of the first magnitude along with such precedents as State v. DiPaolo, 34 N.J. 279,
286-89, 168 A.2d 401, 404-06 (1961), where the court substantially eliminated all territorial
restrictions on the county court's jurisdiction in the trial of criminal cases, and Vineland
Shopping Center, Inc. v. De Marco, 35 N.J. 459, 465-69, 173 A.2d 270, 274-76 (1961), in
which the county district court was held to have an equitable jurisdiction it had never before
possessed. For a more extensive discussion of De Marco see notes 47 & 87 supra.
164 49 N.J. Super. 117, 139 A.2d 302 (App. Div. 1958).
165 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:19-7 (1952) requires filing such an assignment with the
surrogate of the county in which the assignor "resides." Although Old Colony's "statutory
registered" office was in Newark, Essex County, its "principal place of business" was in
Kearny, Hudson County. 49 N.J. Super. at 120, 139 A.2d at 304. Since Old Colony was a
corporation, this was the improper place to file. See note 168 infra.
66 The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. had obtained a judgment against Old Colony
in the Law Division of the Superior Court, Essex County, between August 20, 1956, when
the assignment was executed, and September 13, 1956, when the deed of assignment was
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authorizing the sale. The unnotified creditor, thereafter learning of
the proceedings, moved to vacate the order for lack of notice and
lack of jurisdiction in the court since Old Colony's principal office
was in Essex County rather than in Hudson.1 6 7 The trial court
granted the motion solely on the latter ground, 168 declared all
prior proceedings void, and ordered the case transferred to the
Essex County Surrogate for further proceedings. The assignees
appealed, arguing not against the transfer but the invalidation of
the prior proceedings. The appellate division dismissed the appeal
and endorsed this invalidation. 6 9 Recalling the antecedents of the
rule in the Transfer of Causes Act, it observed:
[T]he rule could not be interpreted as imparting validity to any
orders or judgments rendered by a court which concededly
lacked the power to enter them.
Moreover, transfer of causes under the rule contemplates
the making of a "determination" by only the transferee court.
The action set aside in the present case was of sufficient substance to be considered a part of the determination in the proceedings. It was therefore properly set aside so that the determination in that respect could be made by the proper court. 17 0
filed. 49 N.J. Super. at 120, 139 A.2d at 304. Unexplained delays in filing abounded in the
Old Colony Coal case.
167 49 N.J. Super. at 121-22, 139 A.2d at 305.
168 Id. at 122, 125, 139 A.2d at 305, 307. Reliance was placed on N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:19-45 (1952), which provides:
A corporation making a general assignment shall be deemed . .. a resident of
the county in which its principal office is located, and the county court of such
county or the superior court shall have jurisdiction in the premises.
This provision was upheld to ensure
a precise and a determinable county so that creditors and other interested persons
can search the records in the county where the corporation maintains its statutory
office and know whether the corporation has conveyed its assets to an assignee.
This is a definite and sensible way to determine jurisdiction.
49 N.J. Super. at 126, 139 A.2d at 307.
169 49 N.J. Super. at 124, 139 A.2d at 306. Since not all the issues in controversy
between all the parties involved had been decided at the time the order was entered vacating
the prior proceedings, this order was interlocutory in nature. See, e.g., In re Estate of Uri, 5
N.J. 507, 512, 76 A.2d 249, 251 (1950). Appeals from an interlocutory order at the time Old
Colony Coal was decided had to be made within ten days thereafter. N.J.R.R. 2:2-3(a, now
extended to fifteen days by N.J.R. 2:5-6(a). In the instant case, however, thirty days passed
between the entering of the order and filing of notice of appeal. 49 N.J. Super. at 122, 139
A.2d at 305. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of timeliness, but, having
further decided that the appeal lacked merit and that "the issues are of general interest and
ought to be clarified for the guidance of the bar," it went on to discuss the merits of the case.
Id. at 124, 139 A.2d at 306.
"70 49 N.J. Super. at 125, 139 A.2d at 307 (citation omitted). The court's opinion had
previously noted that the administrative nature of these proceedings necessitated continual
decisions on minor matters prior to any final determination of the issues. Id. at 123, 139
A.2d at 305.
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This observation, however, is misleading on two points. While
the rule itself cannot give validity to the determination of a court
lacking jurisdiction, paragraph (b) of the rule, by providing for an
appellate determination upon the merits and for a subsequent
remand to the transferee court for a formal entry of judgment,
must at least contemplate a process for validating orders or judgments of the trial court, even though the latter might lack the
t7 1
power to enter them.
Further, the court does not sufficiently stress the point that
requirements of due process are the ultimate grounds for invalidation in this type of situation. Where, as here, significant proceedings have transpired in the absence of a non-participating, unrepresented, and unnotified litigant which affect his interest, due
process considerations will demand that, when timely challenged
for lack of jurisdiction, the prior proceedings be invalidated. In
this context, as the court notes,' 72 the transfer must be purely
ministerial. It is not the bare language of the rule which is determinative but the underlying public policy.
A court then must decline to proceed to a hearing and determination on the merits when faced with a timely and valid challenge to its jurisdiction-and in the occasional case of a timely and
valid challenge made to prior proceedings will invalidate them. A
transfer by and between trial courts under paragraph (a) of the
rule must, under the circumstances, be purely procedural without
consequences of validation. And failing this, the disposition under
paragraph (b) of the rule must also be purely procedural; the
appellate court will decline to hear and determine the appeal on
the merits but will instead reverse for lack of jurisdiction. These
are the lessons to be gleaned from the cases.
CONCLUSIONS

The provisions of the Transfer of Causes Rule are of deceiving simplicity. Insofar as they authorize a transfer before a hearing
and determination, they are a matter of minor concern, dealing
171 See pp. 7-8, 21-22 supra.
'12 The intent of the rule as construed by the court was chiefly to avoid wasted time and
duplication of effort by avoiding
the bar of the statute of limitations and the necessity of re-service of process.
Jurisdiction over the person previously obtained would not be vitiated by the lack of
jurisdiction in the court over the subject matter. All pleadings and other papers
already filed would not have to be re-filed or re-instituted ab initio.
49 N.J. Super. at 125, 139 A.2d at 306-07.
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only with the details of practice, the forwarding and receipt of
records. Thus viewed, they advanced the usual policy underlying
the formulation of rules of practice and procedure, "simplicity...
and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."' 7 3 Transfer in these terms at the trial level ordinarily raises no problem, as
was decided by the trial court in In re Old Colony Coal Co. and
affirmed upon appeal.1 74 Transfer upon the same terms from one
appellate court to another, though not strictly authorized in the
rule, can readily be justified on the same basis-simplicity and the
unjustifiable expense and delay.
When we consider the question of validation, we have gone
beyond the simply procedural. We have become involved in the
problem of when and under what circumstances the judgment of a
lower court will be upheld, even though it has not the authority to
make it. Osborn held that the decision of the court will not be
validated when it involves the determination of an unconstitutionally created tribunal to insure the integrity of the judicial system.
We have argued, along somewhat similar lines, that it will not be
validated in a case clearly beyond the court's statutory competence
to act, involving a substantial question of incompetence, such as the
award of an injunction, over a defendant's objection, in the summary practice of the county district court. This case we have called
usurpation. In Knoblock, the appellate division, in effect, applied
that doctrine when it invalidated the judgment of a county district
court in a suit brought by a wife against her husband for arrearages under a support agreement, and in which the trial court had
ignored the husband's timely jurisdictional challenge. The consequence of invalidation is that the appellate court declines to exercise its discretion, given in paragraph (b) of the rule, to hear and
determine the appeal on the merits and to order the entry of the
appropriate judgment in the proper court. In addition, considerations of due process require the invalidation of all prior proceedings had before the appearance of the party, not previously noticed
or represented, who timely challenges their validity (Old Colony
Coal). Superior policy considerations in these cases outweigh the
need for procedural simplicity and the elimination of expense and
delay, and necessitate a decision against validation, either under
N.J.R. 1:1-2. See also N.J.R.R. 4:1-2.
' Of course, transfer does suspend the operation of the statute of limitations. This was

'73

an important objective of both the original statute and the rule of court. Compare note 24.
.supra with note 172 supra. As to whether this is strictly procedural see note 13 supra.
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paragraph (a) of the rule as in Old Colony Coal, or under paragraph
(b) as in Osborn and Knoblock. And in Osborn, the court refused to
apply the rule even to the procedural extent of remanding the case
to a proper trial court for a new trial, the procedure followed in
Old Colony Coal and Knoblock.
On the other hand, when the trial court or trial judge has
under the color of authority proceeded to judgment in the trial of
a claim or issue, without objection of counsel, an appeal from such
judgment will be heard and determined on the merits and judgment entered in the appropriate court. In order for there to be
apparent authority, the case or issue must be one customarily or
frequently heard in that court or similar to one heard there. Thus,
the county district court customarily tries persohal injury cases
ending in zero verdicts (Vorhies). The county court frequently construes a will (Schmidt). A county court judge customarily tries incidental equitable defenses or replies (Scott). The juvenile and
domestic relations court customarily tries some, though not all,
matrimonial support cases (Caravella).
This technique of appellate determination and remand involves the use of a fiction, that the judgment entered is that of the
right court instead of the wrong court, the transparency of which
should be evident when the case culminates in the affirmance of
the original determination on the merits (Vorhies). When the case
ends in a reversal on the merits with a remand for a new trial,
recourse to the fiction is not necessary, since the judgment below
has been undone anyway (Caravella). And a resort to the rules
becomes unnecessary when a case, originally decided against a
plaintiff both on the merits and for lack of jurisdiction after an
ineffectual and ill-timed challenge to the jurisdiction, is reversed
on appeal on the merits: The conservation of judicial energies
requires under the circumstances a disregard of the jurisdictional
issue (Journeymen).
When a court, however, operating under authority to try a
cause proceeds to enter a judgment beyond its power with respect
to the amount of damages, validation will not be given to the
judgment and thus the rule will not apply, usually in deference to
the overriding need to maintain a court of sunmimary practice for
the swift and cheap disposal of cases of inferior worth (Andriola).
Nor on the other hand, will the proceedings be invalidated. Instead, the judgment will be modified to fit the jurisdictional limits
(Andriola and Reiser). The suggestion to the contrary in the concur-
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ring opinion in Ricciardi will probably not be followed. (Ricciardi
itself was held to be a case of proper jurisdiction; thus, the rule did
not apply.)
In sum, the rule operates at two levels. In prescribing the
routine of transfer before hearing and determination, it does affect
a matter of minor concern, of mere practice and procedure. In
authorizing the validity of a determination made before transfer, it
involves matters of major concern; the separation of powers, usurpation of authority, due process, the sound administration of justice, fairness to the parties, etc. In writing its prescriptions for
validation in fictional terms, the rule disguises its content so well as
to deceive sometimes even the judiciary, who treat matters of major
concern as though of minor concern.
Providing for the transfer of causes, with all due respect to the
late Professor Sunderland, is no simple matter. 175 The variables are
considerable, involving, as in the days of old English practice,
reasons of state. The suggestion is sound that the question of
jurisdiction over the subject matter no longer be considered an
absolute bar to the validation of all proceedings, no matter how
untimely raised. As evidenced by this study of New Jersey cases,
the application of this proposal does bring about a flexibility in the
administration of justice, to the end that in every case one feels that
justice has been done. But justice sometimes does require the
invalidation of proceedings. Even in Osborn, which turns on a
question of state, one feels happy to learn of the demise of the
"Marine Navigation Court."
Whether the rule should stand in its present form is doubtful.
There are implicit in the decisions fruitful suggestions for revision
and repeal. An obvious one: the New Jersey supreme court should
announce as a matter of judicial policy-rather than as a supposed
matter of practice and procedure-that the usual American rule
regarding jurisdiction of the subject matter no longer applies in
that state, but has been modified along the above lines; and that
the decision as to validation or modification of prior proceedings
including judgment will be determined in the cases in accordance
with judicial precedents. The rule could then be amended to provide for the simple procedural technique of transfer between trial
courts and between appellate courts prior to hearing and determi175 Professor Sunderland had glibly stated: "Jurisdictional difficulties are so easily
avoidable that no reasonable excuse can be offered for their existence." Sunderland, supra
note 3, at 588.
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nation, no validation being required. The provision for such a
transfer after hearing and determination would be deleted.
In that event, the inconsistencies and confusions arising under
the present rule would be quite substantially reduced. The reform
it was intended to accomplish would indeed have been accomplished. Waiver and consent can sometimes confer jurisdiction.
The fiction of transposition of judgment can now be discarded in
favor of realistic practice.

